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SEARCHING FOR AN EQUITABLE
INTEREST IN A PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION UPON DIVORCE: TIME TO
LEGISLATE THE EMERGING VIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of courts are determining whether a profes-
sional degree or license1 earned during marriage constitutes marital
property in which a working, non-professional spouse may claim a dis-
tributable interest. Twenty-four of the twenty-eight jurisdictions ruling
on the matter have held that a professional degree or license is not
marital property subject to equitable division and distribution.2
1. The terms "degree" or "professional degree" are used as shorthand for a profes-
sional license, advanced degree or education, or the enhanced earning potential associ-
ated with either of them. No distinction is made between the degree or license and the
potential enhanced earning capacity. Supporting spouses have sought an equitable in-
terest in a variety of educational achievements. See infra note 2. Making an illusory
distinction, the court in In re Marriage of Horstman, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978),
noted that the law degree and the admission to practice law themselves did not consti-
tute a distributable marital asset. Rather, the potential for future increased earnings
that the degree and license made possible did constitute such an asset. Id. at 891. See
also Note, Family Sacrifice, infra note 4, at 277 n. II (the distinction between the degree
and the enhanced earning capacity it represents is not clear).
2. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 454 So. 2d 1006 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (law degree);
Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1982) (law degree); Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982), superseded on other grounds,
37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (medical license); In re Mar-
riage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (M.B.A.); Zahler v. Zahler, 8 Fam.
L. Rep. (BNA) 2694 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982) (medical degree); Wright v. Wright, 469
A.2d 803 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983) (dental degree); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (bachelor's degree); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d
234, 470 N.E.2d 551 (1984) (osteopathy degree and license); In re Marriage of
McManama, 179 Ind. App. 513, 386 N.E.2d 953 (1979), vacated on other grounds, 272
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Broadly worded divorce statutes that recognize judicial need for flexi-
bility and discretion to reach equitable results in varying fact situations
encourage ad-hoc approaches to this unique problem, commonly re-
ferred to as the "diploma dilemma."3 Under these liberal legislative
schemes courts are granting a wide variety of awards to resolve a prob-
lem most state legislatures clearly never anticipated. These disparate
remedies, derived from controversial, value-ridden, judge-made law4
Ind. 483, 399 N.E.2d 371 (1980) (law degree); Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329 (Ky.
1985) (medical license); Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985) (medical
degree and license); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981) (medical
license); Ruben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733 (1983) (Ph.D.); Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 450 A.2d 527 (1982) (M.B.A.); Muckelroy v. Muckelroy, 84
N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357 (1972) (medical licensee); Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d
115, 492 N.E.2d 131 (1986) (veterinary degree); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747
(Okla. 1979) (medical license); Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 489 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985) (medical degree); Helm v. Helm, 345 S.E.2d 720 (S.C. 1986) (medical degree);
Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 357 N.W.2d 264 (S.D. 1984) (dental degree); Beeler v. Bee-
ler, 715 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (dental license); Frausto v. Frausto, 611
S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (medical license); Washburn v. Washburn, 101
Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984) (veterinary degree); Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d
200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984) (medical license).
Four jurisdictions have concluded that a professional degree is marital property sub-
ject to equitable division. See In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa
1978) (potential earning capacity that law degree represents constitutes distributable
asset); Reen v. Reen, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2193 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981) (medical
degree and license); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332
(1983) (law degree); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985)
(medical license), remanded, 120 A.D.2d 656, 302 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 212-13, 343 N.W.2d 796, 802-03
(1984) (statutes provide flexible means by which a court can award just compensation to
the supporting spouse using either maintenance or property division or both); Gross-
kopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 823 (Wyo. 1984) (broad discretion of trial court to
grant equitable relief shall not be disturbed unless evident abuse); Martin v. Martin, 358
N.W.2d 793, 797 (S.D. 1984) (no mathematical formula binds trial court's full power to
make equitable division of marital property). For a review of jurisdictions applying the
principle that property division is not subject to rules, formulas, or presumptions, see
Annotation, Divorce-Equitable Distribution, 41 A.L.R.4TH 481, 504-05 (1984).
This Note does not provide a survey of every state statute that addresses this matter.
Even when state legislatures have specifically considered one spouse's contributions to
the other's education, the typically broad language of the statutes reflects a long-stand-
ing reluctance to provide divorce courts with more than general guidelines. See, e.g.,
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); 21-23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983-84); Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-82).
The array of controversial judicial theories as to what is "equitable," "just," or "fair"
has elicited much recent commentary.
4. See, e.g., Equitable Distribution of Degrees and Licenses: Two Theories Toward
Compensating Spousal Contributions, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 301 (1983); Fitzpatrick &
Doucette, Can the Economimc Value of an Education Really Be Measured? A Guide for
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make categorical legal synthesis of the material difficult.
This Note initially summarizes the judicial disagreement 5 concern-
ing if and when the label of "property" should attach to a professional
degree. Next, this Note examines the principal theories and corre-
sponding remedies this debate spawns. The fundamentally improper
and unfair treatment of a degree as marital property is then discussed.
The Note then identifies and advocates the emerging view of both
spouses' respective rights in a professional degree upon divorce. This
view maintains that whether or not a professional degree fits a legal
definition of property is irrelevant.6 A court's sole responsibility,
Marital Property Dissolution, 21 J. FAm. L. 511 (1983); Herring, Divisibility ofAdvanced
Degrees in Equitable Distribution States, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1985); Mullenix,
Valuation of an Educational Degree at Divorce, 16 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 227 (1983); Note,
Property Distribution In Domestic Relations Law: A Proposal For Excluding Educa-
tional Degrees And Professional Licenses From the Marital Estate, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1327 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Excluding Educational Degrees]; Note, Family Law:
Professional Degrees in 1986-Family Sacrifice Equals Family Asset, 25 WASHBURN L.J.
276 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Family Sacrifice]; Note, Equitable Interest In Enhanced
Earning Capacity : The Treatment of a Professional Degree at Dissolution-In re Mar-
riage of Washburn, 60 WASH. L. REV. 431 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Treatment of a
Professional Degree]; Comment, The Equity-Property Dilemma: Analyzing the Work-
ing Spouse's Contributions to the Other's Educational Degree at Divorce, 23 Hous. L.
REV. 991 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, The Equity-Property Dilemma]; Comment,
The Professional Education Earned During Marriage: The Case for Spousal Support, 16
PAC. L.J. 981 (1986) [hereinafter Spousal Support]; Comment, For Richer or Poorer-
Equities in the Career-Threshold, No Asset Divorce, 58 TUL. L. REV. 791 (1974); Com-
ment, 'Till Degree Do Us Part: The Community Property Interest in a Professional De-
gree, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 275 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Community Property
Interest]; see also 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 898 (1983); Annotation,
Spouse's Professional Degree or License as Marital Property for Purposes of Alimony,
Support, or Property Settlement, A.LR.4TH 1294 (Supp. 1986) (spouse's professional
degree or license as marital property for purposes of alimony, support, or property set-
tlement).
Media reports and comments on recent cases are also common. See, e.g., Adler &
Stadman, Justice: Dividing Degrees, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1986, at 61; Court Calls Medi-
cal License Marital Property, Kansas City Star, Dec. 27, 1985, at 3, cols. 1-4; Doctor's
License Ruled Property of Marriage, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, at 4, cols. 1-2; Allen,
Court Recognizes Marital 'Interest' in Medical License, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 13, 1982, at
1; Arnold, Divorce Entitles to Share Doctor's Future Earnings, L.A. Times, Jan. 12,
1982, at 1, col. 6, 7; Granelli, Whose Law Degree Is It Anyway?, National L.J., Feb. 1,
1982, at 6, col. 2; Sullivan, Divorce, American Style, Is Killing Me By Degrees, L.A.
Times, Jan. 19, 1982, at Part II, 5, cols. 1-2.
This Note does not attempt to provide a compendium of the extensive commentary
that has been generated on this issue. The focus, rather, is on courts' past and current
treatment of key issues and development of remedies under existing statutory schemes.
5. Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 158, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 939 (1982).
6. See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
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rather, should be to dissolve a marriage in a manner that is fair to both
parties. This Note suggests that the fairest and least subjective remedy,
consistent with the special relationship of marriage, is to return the
supporting spouse's direct financial contributions to educational costs,
while treating the degree holder's future earnings as his personal and
separate property. Results in professional degree cases will remain un-
predictable, however, until legislatures provide clear remedies that af-
ford less discretion. Accordingly, this Note concludes by proposing
model statutory provisions that incorporate the equitable remedy
under the emerging view.
II. CHARACTERIZING THE PROFESSIONAL DEGREE As
PROPERTY-COMMON THEMES BUT
"DOCTRINAL CHAOS"
The student spouse-working spouse marriage is increasingly com-
mon.7 Typically, the wife' agrees to be the principal breadwinner
while the husband pursues a professional degree.9 Graduate education
generally depletes the couple's assets because of significant educational
7. In Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 173, 677 P.2d 152, 155 (Wash.
1984) the court recognized the commonality of the student spouse-working spouse situ-
ation. The situation has, in fact, become enough of a common occurrence that courts
have coined colloquialisms for it. See e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 231,
485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 554 (1985) ("student-spouse, working-spouse syndrome"); Lovett v.
Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1985) ("diploma dilemma"); Haugan v. Haugan, 117
Wis. 2d 200, 206, 343 N.W.2d 796, 799-800 (1984) ("university degree-divorce de-
gree"). One commentator refers to this phenomenon as "getting a Ph.T.," or, "putting
hubby through." Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educational
Goals: How the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 947, 948 n.4 (1978).
8. To avoid gender difficulties, this Note assumes that the wife is the supporting
spouse, while the husband is the student spouse. Though opposite roles may be taken,
nearly all of the reported cases involve the wife who sought an award for supporting her
husband through professional school. Of the approximately 75 reported cases that have
ruled on how one spouse's contributions to the other's education should be treated, only
two exist in which a husband claimed a distributive interest in his wife's professional
education. The husband was denied relief in each case because he had not made per-
sonal sacrifices during his wife's education that limited his own career plans or advance-
ment. See Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 262 (S.D. 1984); Griffin v.
Griffin, 10 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1091 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22, 1983). See also In re
Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 248, 692 P.2d 175, 182 (1984) (husband with
professional practice may not offset his goodwill with future earning potential of sala-
ried wife).
9. See Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984). In Haugan the
wife worked as an elementary school teacher and performed most of the household
duties during the seven year period in which her husband completed his medical degree
and residency. The couple separated two months before the husband completed his
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expenses and the student spouse's inability to contribute to the couple's
support. The working spouse often foregoes the benefit of a second
income and her own education or career advancement, expecting that
the student spouse's degree will afford them a higher standard of living
in the future. The working spouse never realizes this higher standard
of living when the marriage dissolves just after the student spouse grad-
uates. The supporting spouse's proven ability to support herself often
undermines her claim for alimony.'o Even if an alimony claim is suc-
cessful, the working spouse may not fare well because alimony pay-
ments are, in part, based on the couple's standard of living established
during the marriage, often low in this situation."1 Compounding this
injustice is the fact that after the couple divides the little marital prop-
erty they did accumulate, the student spouse parts with a professional
degree and a higher earning potential, while the working spouse is
often left with only a divorce decree and unfulfilled expectations. 2
The majority of divorce statutes provide for equitable distribution of
property acquired during the marriage. 3 To qualify for a partial dis-
residence, at which time the couple had acquired substantial liabilities and few assets.
117 Wis. 2d at 202, 343 N.W.2d at 798.
10. See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 1981) (work-
ing spouse not entitled to maintenance when having a demonstrated ability of self-sup-
port, under MiNN. STAT. § 518.552 (1980)); Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1982) (compensation under maintenance provision, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.200 (2), intended to allow spouse to become self-sufficient).
11. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for
the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REv. 379, 399 (1980). Many states
expressly provide that the couple's established standard of living is a relevant factor
courts must consider in determining the necessity, amount, duration, and manner of
payment of alimony. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 23-501(b)(8) (Purdon Supp.
1982-83). Most statutes are not clear, however, as to what effect a high or low standard
of living should have on claims for alimony. Some courts believe that a demonstrated
high standard of living during the marriage is evidence that the non-professional spouse
has already realized the benefits of the education. Martin v. Martin, 358 N.W.2d 793
(S.D. 1984). Alimony is reduced to the extent of that realization. See supra notes 144-
49 and accompanying text (discusses effect of accumulated assets on alimony and dis-
tributive awards). Other courts hold that the working spouse's claim for alimony is
strengthened if her contributions to the student spouse's education aided the couple's
attainment of a better standard of living during the marriage. Stevens v. Stevens, 23
Ohio St. 3d 115, 121-23, 492 N.E.2d 141, 136-37 (1986). Under the statute proposed in
this Note, the extent to which the working spouse realizes such benefits from contribut-
ing to the professional spouse's education is irrelevant in determining her right to com-
pensation. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
12. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 231, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 554 (1985).
13. Although no generally accepted definition of "equitable distribution" exists, the
doctrine refers to wide judicial authority to make an equitable distribution of property
19871
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tribution of the student spouse's expected lifetime earnings, the work-
ing spouse seeks a liberal construction of "property."' 4 If a court
concludes that the professional degree is marital property, the divorce
statutes provide that the working spouse will gain a divisible share of
the student spouse's future earnings.' 5 A minority of courts follow this
"property" view but their approaches to the problem vary. When, for
example, traditional marital assets are available for distribution, some
courts believe that equity can be achieved without characterizing the
degree as distributable marital property.' 6 Other courts conclude that
acquired during the marriage, regardless of legal title. See Annotation, Divorce: Equita-
ble Distribution Doctrine, 41 A.L.R.4TH 481, 487 (1984). A key difference between eq-
uitable distribution statutes and common law is the recognition of a spouse's non-
financial contributions to the marital estate. Most courts recognize that property divi-
sion, under equitable distribution theory, is directly related to other economic awards of
alimony and child support. Id. at 487, 516-18. If the marital estate is large enough, an
equitable distribution is preferable to periodic support payments. Id. See infra notes
105-109 and accompanying text. See also Note, Excluding Educational Degrees, supra
note 4, at 1327 n.2.
14. Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 352, 493 A.2d 1074, 1077 (1985). Plaintiffs
often insist that a liberal construction of "property" that encompasses non-traditional
forms of property is necessary to "effect the broad remedial purposes" of divorce stat-
utes. Id. The court in In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, 470 N.E.2d
551 (1984) acknowledged Illinois' acceptance of a broad definition of "property," which
connoted "any tangible or intangible res which might be made the subject of owner-
ship." Id. at 244, 470 N.E.2d at 559 (citing In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 111. App. 3d
1023, 1026, 423 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (1981)). In spite of this sweeping definition, the
court noted that to qualify as property, "the res must be in the nature of a present
property interest, rather than a mere expectancy interest." Id.
Divorce statutes and their legislative histories typically provide courts with little or
no guidance as to the meaning of the word "property." Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J.
488, 495, 453 A.2d 527, 531 (1982).
15. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-82). The statute provides in pertinent
part:
Property Division: Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation
... the court shall divide the property of the parties ... Any property shown to
have been acquired by either party prior to or during the course of the marriage as
a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance or to have been paid for by either party with
funds so acquired shall remain the property of such party and may not be subjected
to property division ... The court shall presume that all other property is to be
divided equally between the parties, but may alter this distribution without regard
to marital misconduct after considering:
(5)" The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning
power of the other.
Id.
16. The presence of marital assets, whether accumulated through use of the degree
or otherwise, satisfies most courts that an equitable distribution can be made without
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/7
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although a degree is not property in a literal sense, it is an "asset of the
marriage."17 Still other courts maintain that the increase in the stu-
dent spouse's earning power, rather than the degree itself, constitutes a
distributable marital asset.18 Because each of these approaches pro-
duce similar results, identifying meaningful differences in the underly-
ing rationales is difficult. The remedies produced are not factually
based or objectively reasoned, but reveal a judicial abhorrence of inade-
quate rewards for a supporting spouse's efforts. 9
Most courts hold that neither the professional degree nor its holder's
increased earning capacity are property subject to equitable allocation
upon divorce. Like the minority, however, an individual sense of fair-
ness rather than predictable legal standards typically guides these deci-
sions. Five of the more common rationale are: (1) the degree lacks the
traditional attributes of "property;" 2 (2) the value of a degree is too
speculative;21 (3) the characterization of marriage as a commercial en-
considering division of a professional degree. See, e.g., Meinholz v. Meinholz, 283 Ark.
509, 678 S.W.2d 348, 350 (1984). For courts that recognize a professional degree as
divisible property, such accumulated assets represent a realization of the supporting
spouse's expectancy. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749. Oddly enough,
this does not alter either side's view of the degree's property or non-property classifica-
tion. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Ky. 1985) ("[a]lthough a pro-
fessional degree, a license to practice, or an acquired specialty may not be property in
the liberal sense, they are assets of the marriage"). Despite this characterization that the
degree is an asset subject to division, the court concluded that the degree represents a
relevant factor in the duration and size of alimony. Id. at 333. See infra notes 98-101
and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978); In re
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 433, 574 P.2d 75, 79 (1978) (Carrigan, J., dissent-
ing). The courts' non-uniform labelling of the disputed interest in the degree has added
much confusion to the issue. In spite of the various labels used, the enhanced earning
potential from the degree is the only proper element of the degree's value to which
courts can rationally refer. The professional spouse's potential income stream is the
only valuable aspect of the student's achievement in which a former supporting spouse
could seek an interest.
19. Justice Thompson, in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548
(1985), explained his preference for a marital property award over a restitutionary
award, noting that such award "does not relegate [the working spouse] to the role of an
alternative to a student loan." Id. at 239, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
20. Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 352, 493 A.2d 1074, 1077 (1985). See also
Note, Family Sacrifice, supra note 4, at 277.
21. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); In re
Marriage of Goldstein, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981); Lynn v. Lynn, 91
N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982); Pacht v. Jadd, 13 Ohio App. 3d 363, 469 N.E.2d 918
(1983); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984); O'Brien v. O'Brien,
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
180 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 32:173
terprise demeans the concept of marriage;22 (4) the future earning ca-
pacity of the student spouse is a personal, unpredictable, post-marital
effort;2" and (5) the supporting spouse's contributions towards the
other spouse's education are most important when awarding alimony
or distributing property.24 This wide variety of decision rationales
clearly demonstrates the lack of a solution to the diploma dilemma.
The controversy cries for a strictly defined solution from the state
106 A.D.2d 223, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1985). See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying
text.
22. For example, in its rejection of the "marriage as commercial enterprise" theory,
the court in Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1982) commented
that it would not "strike a balance" among the spouses' respective contributions to the
marriage to determine a monetary award, because "[t]o do so would diminish the indi-
vidual personalities of the husband and wife to economic entities and reduce the institu-
tion of marriage to that of a closely held corporation." Id. at 207. See infra notes 61-79
and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
24. Most courts recognize that to completely ignore the working spouse's contribu-
tions would be unfair. See infra notes 107-21 and accompanying text. The courts
dramatize the unfairness of the situation in a number of ways. In Mahoney v. Mahoney
the court stated that it was "patently unfair that the supporting spouse be denied the
mutually anticipated benefit while the supported spouse keeps not only the degree, but
also all of the financial and material rewards flowing from it." 91 N.J. 488, 500, 453
A.2d 527, 533-34 (1982).
Some courts also recognize the supporting spouse's non-financial contributions and
personal sacrifices. These "opportunity costs" include the couple's reduced standard of
living and income stemming from the student spouse's foregone employment and the
opportunities for career advancement or education that the working spouse may have
passed up in order to support the couple. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 213, 343
N.W.2d 796 (1984). In Haugan the court expressed its approval of awarding to the
supporting spouse her share in such opportunity costs for purposes of quantifying the
value of her contributions to the marriage and the student spouse's education. Id. at
803.
Because out-of-pocket expenses often pale against the opportunity costs of obtaining a
professional education, some commentators feel that opportunity costs represent the
true cost of the education. Spousal Support, supra note 4, at 998, 1001-06.
Viewing the unfairness another way, some judges look at the degree as the end prod-
uct of a concerted family effort in which the supporting spouse shared the burden, self-
deprivation, and stress of the experience. The court in Woodworth v. Woodworth
stated:
[F]airness dictates that the spouse who did not earn an advanced degree be com-
pensated whenever the advanced degree is the product of such concerted family
investment. The degree holder has expended great effort to obtain the degree not
only for him-or herself, but also to benefit the family as a whole. The other
spouse has shared in this effort and contributed in other ways as well, not merely as
a gift to the student spouse nor merely to share individually in the benefits but to
help the marital unit as a whole.
126 Mich. App. 258, 261, 337 N.W.2d 332, 334 (1983).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/7
PROFESSIONAL DEGREE MARITAL PROPERTY
legislatures.2 5
III. THE PROPERTY DEBATE
A. The Fundamental Incorrectness of Classifying a Professional
Degree as Divisible Marital Property
In spite of their disagreement over the characterization of a profes-
sional degree as marital property, courts on both sides of the debate
agree that the real value of a degree is the potential earning capacity it
represents.26 Ironically, both sides use this observation to justify oppo-
site conclusions as to whom that value belongs. In re Marriage of Gra-
ham 2 7 pioneered rejection of a degree as distributable marital property.
In Graham the husband attended school and acquired both an engi-
neering and an M.B.A. degree during three and one half years of the
couple's six year marriage.2" The Colorado Supreme Court held that
an education is not property subject to division under Colorado's Uni-
form Dissolution Act.2 9
The Graham court popularized two points that distinguish a degree
from the traditional concept of property. First, the degree has no ob-
jectively determinable market value.3 ° Second, the degree is personal
25. In Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 492 N.E.3d 131 (1986), the court
recognized the ambiguity in Ohio's "hybrid statute." Id. at 137. The court, though
recognizing persuasive arguments for treating a professional degree or its earning capac-
ity as a distributable marital asset, refused to make such a finding without an explicit
decision from the legislature. Id. See supra notes 3-5, 13-19 and accompanying text.
26. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 493, 453 A.2d 527, 5231-32 (1982);
Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 354, 493 A.2d 1074, 1080 (1985).
27. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
28. Id. at 76. The trial court determined that during the marriage the wife contrib-
uted 70% of the financial support, which included her husband's education. 194 Colo.
429 (1977). The trial court estimated the future earnings value of the M.B.A. at
$82,836 and awarded 40% ($33,134) to his wife. Id. The appellate court reversed this
ruling, holding that an education is not properly subject to division under Colorado's
Uniform Dissolution Act. 555 P.2d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). The Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed this reversal. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
29. The court acknowledged the Colorado legislature's intent to give the term
"property" a broad inclusive meaning. Id. at 76. The term's traditional and commonly
understood meaning, however, limits what may be considered property, thereby pre-
cluding a degree from falling within that category. Id. at 76-77.
30. In concluding that an educational degree has none of the usual attributes of
property, the court in Graham stated:
An educational degree ... is simply not encompassed even by the broad views of
... "property." It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferrable
value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on the death of
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to the holder.31 Valuation of a degree is difficult because various per-
sonal variables such as intelligence, integrity, ability, diligence, re-
sourcefulness, and fate determine whether the potential for increased
earnings will be realized.3 2 Even if the degree's value can be estimated,
unforeseen events may exist that could impair the holder's earning
potential.3
Graham further distinguished a degree from conventional marital
property by recognizing that an award of a percentage of the degree-
holding spouse's future earnings to the supporting spouse is tanta-
mount to vesting the supporting spouse with a proprietary right to the
the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, con-
veyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of
previous education, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be ac-
quired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement
that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property.
Id. at 75. The Supreme Courts of several states have agreed with Graham. See, e.g.,
Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1985); Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d
1074 (1985); Ruben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733 (1983); Mahoney v. Maho-
ney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 492
N.E.2d 131 (1986); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); Lehmicke v.
Lehmicke, 489 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d
250 (S.D. 1984); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984). But see In re
Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (1978) (though court had no quarrel with
Graham language, it was the student spouse's enhanced earning capacity, not the de-
gree, that constituted the marital asset).
31. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
32. Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 489 A.2d 782, 788 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Accord
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 225, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550, modified, 489 N.E.2d
712, 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1985). Apart from such labor, the degree has no
pecuniary value susceptible of measurement. 106 A.D.2d at 226, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
33. DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Ct. App. 1980). Spe-
cifically, one who is newly qualified for a given profession may later abandon it, fail it,
or experience an income level far below that of his colleagues because he practices in a
lower yielding specialty, location, or manner. Id.
Based on the concern that equitable distribution might be misused to permit courts to
make a career decision for a licensed spouse still in training, at least one judge has
suggested that the courts be allowed to revise any distributive award to conform to
reality. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 752 (1985). Valu-
ation of the degree before the holder's career began would involve a "gamut of calcula-
tions." Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 493, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (1982).
Unfortunately, divorce in diploma dilemma cases typically occurs before the profes-
sional spouse's career gets underway. In these career-threshold, no-asset situations a
court predisposed towards protecting the working spouse's expectancy interest is likely
to find a property interest in the degree. Comment, Is a Professional Degree Marital
Property Under Virginia's Marriage Dissolution Statutes?, 7 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 47,
53, 76 n.169 (1984).
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student spouse's very person.34 Whether a business degree or a licensee
to practice medicine, a degree is nothing more than a privilege con-
ferred upon the student spouse that only the state may regulate or
alienate.3" Thus, if the degree constitutes an asset at all, it is one that
the student spouse holds as the property of his own person to the exclu-
sion of others.
3 6
The Graham rationale elicits a variety of criticisms and counter-ar-
guments, at the heart of which is a belief that courts should go beyond
the strict traditional definition of property.37 In the absence of precise
34. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550. See Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 752
(Okla. 1979) (working spouse entitled to cash award but limited fair compensation to
spouse's past investments, rather than a "vested interest" in licensed spouse's future
earnings).
35. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550-51. The non-transferable privilege that a diploma
or certificate memorializes is conferred only upon the student's fulfillment of the grant-
ing authority's requirements. Id. at 551.
36. Id. The minority view's expansion of divisible marital property to include a
professional degree indicates a concession that legislators have not clearly provided for
its division and distribution. Legislative inaction, in states whose supreme courts have
held that a professional degree is not divisible marital property, may also indicate the
legislatures' approval of that position. This Note argues, however, that the issue is not
appropriate for the judiciary to decide.
37. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 560 (1985) (Thompson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that complete reliance upon tradi-
tional concepts of property is unrealistic and inappropriate in seeking equity). As one
judge put it, we "now look to 'resources' as opposed to a particular asset or tangible
piece of property..." Lynn v. Lynn, 7 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001, 3002 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1980). For commentary advocating a dynamic "new property" with respect to profes-
sional degrees, see Mullenix, supra note 4, at 254-56; Note, Family Sacrifice, supra note
4, at 301-02; Note, Treatment of a Professional Degree, supra note 4, at 441-45. Com-
mentators favoring a degree's classification as marital property maintain that to recog-
nize the right to practice one's profession as a valuable property right is inconsistent
with the conclusion that a professional degree is not a property asset. See, e.g., Mul-
lenix, supra note 4, at 256 (emphasis added). There is nothing anomalous, however,
with these two conclusions. As one judge asked, "[w]hat kind of property are we all
talking about?" O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
The right to ply one's trade is a constitutionally protected right that has intrinsic not
monetary value to its holder, and may only be removed under due process of law.
Crook v. Baker, 584 F. Supp. 1531 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (advanced degree represents
property interest which state may not rescind without first affording due process of
law). Thus, the degree cannot be properly classed as tangible distributable marital
property. Interpreting New Mexico's community property statutes, the court in Muck-
elroy v. Muckelroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357 (1972) pointed out that while "the right
to engage in a licensed profession is a protected property right ... not all property rights
are property within the meaning of the ... statutes. Id. at 15-16, 498 P.2d at 1358.
Accord Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 725, 155 P.2d 637, 641 (1945) (right
to practice medicine is property right, but not one that can be classed as community
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statutory provisions, the judiciary's attempts to expand the concept of
marital property to embrace a degree rely less on how closely a degree
resembles conventional property than on notions of fairness. 38 Because
a degree represents a marriage's most valuable, if not sole asset, propo-
nents of protecting a wife's expectancy interest believe that the only
way to achieve an equitable result is to treat the degree as marital prop-
erty.39 These courts believe that only by devising extraordinary reme-
dies can they meet their responsibility to prevent injustice.'
B. Using Theories Outside Divorce Law To Support
the Degree-as-Property Theory
Faced with broad statutory guidelines, scant legislative history, and
little precedent, courts attempt to draw analogies from unrelated com-
mon law theories to support their view of professional degrees as dis-
tributable marital property. These borrowed concepts were developed,
property). But see O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (Thompson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (privilege to practice medicine that student spouse had converted
from education was in the nature of a franchise subject to equitable distribution as mari-
tal property).
38. See Krauskopf, supra note 11, at 388-89. Some commentators insist that courts
do not need to restrict "property" to its traditional meaning when assessing marital
assets. In In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), the dissent
stated that the majority's restrictive view of property unjustly limited remedies. "While
the majority... focuses on whether the husband's... degree is marital 'property'...,
it is not the degree itself which constitutes the asset in question. Rather it is the increase
in [his] earning power concomitant to that degree which is the asset conferred on him
by his wife's efforts." Id. at 435, 574 P.2d at 79 (Carrigan, J., dissenting). But see
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982), in which the court noted that
New Jersey courts subject a broad range of assets and interests to equitable division, yet
distinguished an educational degree from those forms of divisible property. Id. at 492,
453 A.2d at 531.
39. See Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 205, 343 N.W.2d 796, 800 (1984)
(because degree is most significant asset of marriage, working spouse must be allowed to
participate in financial rewards attributable to the student spouse's enhanced earning
capacity).
40. In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 434, 574 F.2d 75, 78 (1978) (Carri-
gan, J., dissenting) (student spouse's enhanced earning capacity must be considered
marital asset to prevent extraordinary injustice). Cf Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d
747, 752 (Okla. 1979) (working spouse has right to compensation for contributions to
marriage's only valuable asset to extent of actual investment).
Characterizations of the degree as the marriage's only asset, however, did not per-
suade the court in DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980),
which refused to recognize how "attempting to place a dollar value on something so
intangible as a professional education, degree, or license" could serve any conceivable
form of equity. 98 Wis. 2d at 57, 296 N.W.2d at 767.
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however, with different policy goals in mind. As a result, they are not
properly adaptable to fairly resolving the issue of whether an equitable
interest lies in a professional degree.
Courts often express concern about characterizing the degree and its
potential earning capacity as a divisible asset because of the speculative
and restrictive nature of such an award.4 Judges adopting the "prop-
erty" view, however, consistently find support for these awards in areas
where other intangible and speculative property rights are estimated
and distributed. These areas include the accounting concept of good-
will,42 wrongful death and personal injury actions,4 3 and pension and
retirement benefits. 4
1. Goodwill
The majority view is that a degree does not fit the traditional concept
of property because it is intangible and cannot be valued with certainty.
Opponents respond by arguing that valuation of a degree is no more
41. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 558. The appellate court's dissent in O'Brien con-
ceded that concern over such speculation was legitimate. Yet the dissent argued that it
was an "inadequate basis" for denying the supporting spouse a share in her ex-hus-
band's estimated future earnings. Id. (Thompson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in Part).
42. For cases in which the primary issue was whether goodwill existed, see In re
Marriage of Hall, 101 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984) (physician in private practice
has goodwill but salaried professor does not); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App.
481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976) (physician in private practice); In re Marriage of Freedman,
35 Wash. App. 49, 665 P.2d 902 (attorney in private practice). See also In re Marriage
of Kaplan, 23 Wash. App. 503, 597 P.2d 439 (1979) (existence of goodwill is a question
of fact).
For professional degree cases attempting to draw support from goodwill cases, see In
re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (1978) (Carrigan, J., dissenting)
(husband's future earning potential indicated by goodwill value of professional prac-
tice); Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 180, 677 P.2d 152, 162 (1984) (veteri-
nary license, like goodwill, is an intangible property interest). For additional
commentary regarding the goodwill valuation analogy, see Weitzman, The Economics
of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 1181, 1214-15 (1981); Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on
Marital Dissolution: Is It Property or Another Name For Alimony?, 52 CAL. ST. BAR J.
1, 27 (Jan.-Feb. 1977).
43. See, e.g., Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 180, 677 P.2d 152, 162
(1984); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 79 (1978) (Carrigan, J.,
dissenting); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1979). A discussion of
analogies to tort recovery can be found in Krauskopf, supra note 38, at 388-89.
44. See, e.g., Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975); DeRevere v.
DeRevere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 746, 491 P.2d 249, 252 (1971). See also Foster & Freed,
Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension Benefits, 16 J. FAM. L. 187 (1977-78).
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elusive than the established process of distributing and valuing good-
will in a professional practice.45 Goodwill is personal to the holder and
cannot be transferred, conveyed, or pledged. Judicially accepted meth-
ods of valuing professional goodwill, therefore, should easily adapt to
the valuation of a degree.46 Although advocates of this view recognize
that valuation can be difficult, they believe that this difficulty is an im-
proper basis for refusing to acknowledge the degree's potential value.
The important point is not the means by which goodwill is valued, but
that a property interest is found in an intangible, thus permitting its
equitable distribution upon dissolution.47
Proponents of the property view maintain that to treat the support-
ing spouse of a salaried professional differently from the supporting
spouse of a professional who is associated with a practice is illogical
and unfair. Both types of professionals earned their degrees while mar-
ried, yet goodwill exists, if at all, only in the case of the practicing
professional.48 Property theory proponents question the justice in
awarding "marital property" when the spouse has been practicing a
profession two weeks before the divorce proceedings started, but not
when the licensed spouse will not launch his or her practice until two
weeks after the divorce proceedings commence.49 This anomaly dem-
onstrates both the awkwardness and inequity of trying to fit a round
45. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1985), re-
inanded, 120 A.D.2d 656, 302 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1986). Courts typically define profes-
sional goodwill as the "expectation of continued public patronage." In re Marriage of
Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 483, 558 P.2d 279, 280 (1976). More specifically, it has
been defined as:
[A] benefit or advantage which is acquired by an establishment beyond the mere
value of the capital, stock, funds or property employed therein, in consequence of
the general public patronage and encouragement, which it receives from constant
or habitual customers on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or
reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circum-
stances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.
Id. at 483-84, 558 P.2d at 281. See also In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 239,
692 P.2d 175, 178 (1984) (goodwill is a property or asset that supplements the earning
capacity of another asset, business, or profession).
46. In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984). See Mullenix,
supra note 4, at 257-59 (both goodwill and educational degrees should be recognized as
intangible property assets, capable of valuation upon divorce). But see Nail v. Nail, 486
S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) (professional goodwill is not a separate asset capable of valua-
tion and division upon dissolution of marriage).
47. Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 178, 677 P.2d 152, 162 (1984) (Ros-
ellini, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716-17, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 748 (1985).
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peg-a professional degree-into a square hole-the traditional con-
cept of property.
The deficiencies in the goodwill-professional degree analogy become
apparent when one compares the degree's intrinsic value, the enhanced
earning capacity of its holder, to goodwill In Hall x Hal5  the Wash-
ington Supreme Court held that a professional in private practice has
goodwill, but a comparably educated professional working as a salaried
employee does not.5 The court noted that goodwill is an asset that
supplements the earning capacity of another asset, such as a profession,
but is neither the earning capacity itself nor merely a factor contribut-
ing to the practice's earning capacity.52 Rather, goodwill is a "distinct
asset of a professional practice."5 3 Unlike goodwill, which merely di-
minishes when the professional leaves the business, a professional's
earning capacity disappears when he dies or retires.5 The fundamen-
tal difference is that although the practicing and salaried professionals
both have earning capacities, only the practicing professional has a
practice to which his goodwill can attach.5
Explaining its view of the relationship between the practice and the professional's earn-
ing capacity, the court stated:
An established practice merely represents the exercise of the privileges conferred
upon the professional spouse by the license and the income flowing from that prac-
tice represents the receipt of the enhanced earning capacity that licensure allows.
That being so, it would be unfair not to consider the license a marital asset.
Id.
50. 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984).
51. Id. at 241, 692 P.2d at 178. The court would not allow the practicing profes-
sional spouse to apply his salaried professional wife's equivalent earning capacity to
offset the distributable portion of his established professional goodwill for property dis-
tribution. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The components of goodwill distinguish a practicing professional from a
salaried professional. The Hall court explained:
The practicing professional brings an earning capacity to the practice comprised of
skill and education. The goodwill, comprised of such things as location, referrals,
associations, reputation, trade name and office organization, can directly supple-
ment this earning capacity. When the practicing professional dies, retires or moves
he takes his skill and education with him, but the goodwill factors must be trans-
ferred or otherwise left behind. The goodwill may exist even though it is not mar-
ketable ....
The salaried professional also brings an earning capacity comprised of skill and
education to the position. However, when the salaried professional leaves ... he
takes everything with him to the new position. There is nothing that increased his
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An additional distinction between goodwill and a professional degree
is that the goodwill of a professional practice is valued at its present
market value before distribution.56 A professional degree, however,
has no market value capable of estimation or valuation.57 Typically,
when a marriage breaks up just as the recently graduated spouse begins
the professional career, the degree holder has not yet capitalized on the
degree's benefits. Thus, no meaningful evidence of the degree's value
exists.5 8 At that point, the degree is worth only what was spent to
acquire it.5 9
2. Tort Law
Perhaps the most common argument against the distribution of an
interest in a professional degree as marital property is that its worth is
not subject to precise valuation.' Courts favoring distribution respond
that ascertaining a degree's value is no more speculative than determin-
ing the economic value of a victim's earning capacity in personal injury
cases or wrongful death actions.61 This analogy to tort law is mis-
placed and inappropriate for several important policy reasons. Tort
victims receive as loss compensation awards based on future earnings.
In contrast, the distribution of marital property is intended to equitably
divide property accumulated during marriage.6 2 Compensation is not
earning capacity in the old salaried position that cannot be taken to the new
position.
Id,
56. Comment, Community Property Interest, supra note 4, at 288-89. The market
value approach sets a value on professional goodwill by determining the fair price at
which the practice could be sold in the open market.
57. Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 489 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
58. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (best mea-
sure of spouse's interest in a degree is the amount spent for direct support and school
expenses during the period of the education, plus reasonable interest and adjustments
for inflation); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981) (wife enti-
tled to reimbursement of her husband's living expenses and direct educational costs).
But see DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 56-57, 296 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App. 1980)
(Inman's "cost approach" rejected because it fails to consider scholastic efforts and acu-
men of degree holder and merely treats parties as business partners).
60. Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 117, 492 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1986).
61. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62. See Note, Excluding Educational Degrees, supra note 4, at 1349. Determining
the future value of the professional spouse's earnings for compensatory purposes is inap-
propriate in the context of dissolution. Id. Yet, the marital estate consists of identifi-
able assets subject to accurate division.
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an appropriate policy goal in marital property distribution.6 3
Tort and divorce law are further distinguishable because tort awards
are based on a theory of fault. Most states have abandoned fault as a
basis of dissolution awards.' 4 The tort analogy is plainly unsuitable in
the dissolution context
3. Pension Rights
The weakest of the three analogies equates professional degrees with
employee pension rights, which are often recognized as divisible mari-
tal property.65 One court recognized that pension benefits represent a
63. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 341, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1981) (re-
jecting the wife's claim for restitution for the value of her homemaking services and for
the couple's reduced income during the husband's lengthy training period). The court
reasoned:
In each marriage, for example, the couple decides on a certain division of labor,
and while there is value to what each spouse is doing, whether it be labor for mone-
tary compensation or homemaking, that value is consumed by the community in
the on-going relationship and forms no basis for a claim of unjust enrichment upon
dissolution.
Id. The same court in Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1982),
although reaffirming the position with respect to the "usual and incidental activities of
the marital relationship," noted an exception. Id. at 203. Where "the facts demonstrate
an agreement between the spouses and an extraordinary or unilateral effort by one
spouse which inures solely to the benefit of the other by the time of dissolution," the
court concluded that restitution is appropriate to prevent the unjust enrichment of one
spouse at the expense of the other. Id. at 203-04. See infra note 119 and accompanying
text. Cf Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 261, 337 N.W.2d 332, 335-
36 (1983) (although court did not believe spouses expect compensation for their efforts
in marriage, finding that law degree was marital property was necessary to protect
working spouse's share of the fruits of the degree).
See Note, Excluding Educational Degrees, supra note 4, at 1349. The commentator
concludes that a division of the marital estate that recognizes these policy differences
will avoid undue prejudice to the student spouse who may earn less than anticipated.
Id.
64. See Freed & Foster, Divorce In The Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q.
229, 276-83 (1981). According to Freed & Foster, only Illinois and South Dakota pro-
vide for fault as grounds for divorce; all other jurisdictions now operate under "no-
fault" divorce schemes. Id. See also Mullenix, supra note 4, at 270.
Although most statutes do not expressly authorize courts to consider fault for pur-
poses of equitable distribution and support awards, they often allow courts to consider
other relevant factors in dissolution proceedings. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.21(l)(m) (West 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 501(b)(14) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
Such provisions may serve as judicial authority for accepting evidence of fault.
65. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1976) (en banc); Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981); Weir v.
Weir, 173 N.J. Super. 130, 413 A.2d 638 (1980).
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form of deferred compensation for services rendered to the employer
and, as such, are a contractual right derived from the terms of the em-
ployment contract. 6 Supporters of this theory thus conclude that the
pension represents a current asset and is a form of property. 67 The
right to pension payments, however, is in sharp contrast to a mere ex-
pectancy of future income that a professional degree may produce. 68
C. Marriage Characterized as a Economic Partnership
or Business Venture
Courts that apply property concepts to professional degrees gener-
ally treat marriage as a commercial enterprise or business partnership.
Equitable distribution theorists69 view the supporting spouse's contri-
bution to the marriage as one "partner's" contribution to the accumu-
lation of all family assets, which entitles her to a proportionate share in
the property of the enterprise.70 The supporting spouse's contributions
to the student spouse's education are thus similar to an "investment" in
the family.7 ' Dissolution prevents the supporting spouse from realiz-
66. Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 357, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079 (1985).
67. Id. at 363, 493 A.2d at 1079-80.
68. Id.
69. See supra notes 13-15, infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
70. In O'Brien the New York Court of Appeals found that New York's equitable
distribution statute considered marriage an economic partnership. Thus, upon dissolu-
tion of the marriage, "there should be a winding up of the parties' economic affairs and
a severance of their economic ties by an equitable distribution of the marital assets: 489
N.E.2d 712, 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747 (1985). As a general rule, the court concluded,
"marital fault is inconsistent with the underlying assumption that marriage is an eco-
nomic partnership" in which each party is entitled to his fair share upon its dissolution.
Id. at 719, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
In a typical economic partnership, no guarantee exists that the venture will realize a
profit, therefore, each partner accepts the risk that the enterprise may experience losses
or even total failure. Further, the extent of each partner's right to share in any profits in
a measure of his or her direct financial contribution to the entity's capital. See generally
Krauskopf, supra note 38, at 386-88 (economic analysis of the family as a business firm).
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in DeWitt rejected this partnership view of mar-
riage, stating that it "treats the parties as though that marriage is not 'so coldly under-
taken.'" 98 Wis. 2d 44, 50, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980). In Wisner the Arizona
Court of Appeals similarly rejected the "business partnership" theory. 129 Ariz. 333,
631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981). The court reasoned that the spouses determine what
each will contribute to the marriage and that the decision to support the student
spouse's pursuit of a professional degree is "mutual, consensual and made with full
understanding of the sacrifices that necessarily [accompany] the decision." Id. at 341,
631 P.2d at 123.
71. See, e.g., Woodworth, 337 N.W.2d at 334 (mutual sacrifice and effort constitutes
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ing an expected return on that investment.72 Under a contract theory,
many of the same courts believe that the student spouse's retention of
benefits from the working spouse's support during the educational pe-
riod constitutes unjust enrichment.73
Reflecting on a couple's pursuit of a professional degree as a business
venture, the court in Lehmicke v. Lehmicke 74 recognized the anomaly
family investment in marital unit as a whole); accord Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 190,
677 P.2d at 164 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). Compare Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 750-52 (sup-
porting spouse's contributions characterized as an "investment," but recovery limited to
past investment, rather than including a "vested interest" in degree holder's future
earnings).
72. The debate over what constitutes the supporting spouse's "expectancy" often
depends on the judges' personal opinions because of the statutes' broad wording.
73. See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1982);
Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 268, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983).
Most courts find the concept of unjust enrichment both appropriate and useful in pro-
fessional degree cases. A variety of opinions exist, however, concerning the amount and
form of compensation needed to prevent unjust enrichment. Opposing views range
from restitution to an award based on the supporting spouse's expectancy in the student
spouse's enhanced earning power. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d
885 (Iowa 1978) (restitution); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)
(restitution); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Woodworth, 126
Mich. App. at 268, 337 N.W.2d at 337 (expectancy). See also Pinnell, Divorce After
Professional School: Education and Future Earning Capacity May Be Marital Property,
44 Mo. L. REV. 329, 335 (1979) (expectancy). But see Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333,
341, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1981) (unjust enrichment, as a legal concept, is inap-
propriate for marital application); Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 175, 677
P.2d 152, 156 (1984) (unjust enrichment theory that places value on supporting spouse's
contributions is inappropriate in context of marriage); Church v. Church, 96 N.M. 388,
395, 630 P.2d 1243, 1250 (1981) (wife's homemaking services not a basis for an equita-
ble award based on unjust enrichment, applying Virginia law). For an illustration of a
thorough application of traditional contract principles applied to a professional degree
case, see Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1982).
The most common criticism of restitutionary awards is that they do not recognize the
working spouse's contributions toward yet unrealized marital assets, particularly when
the marriage did not endure long enough to convert the student spouse's enhanced earn-
ing potential into accumulated marital assets. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. at 268, 337
N.W.2d at 337.
In Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982), the New Jersey Supreme
Court, recognizing the potential for unjust enrichment of the student spouse, introduced
the concept of "reimbursement alimony." Reimbursement alimony provides for the
return of all financial contributions that the supporting spouse made towards the former
spouse's education, including household and travel expenses. Id. at 501, 453 A.2d at
534. See also Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 123, 492 N.E.2d 131, 138 (1986)
(Wright, J., concurring) (supporting spouse entitled to repayment or recovery of "in-
vestment" to prevent unjust enrichment, but recoupment limited to actual
expenditures).
74. 489 A.2d 782, 789-90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Wieand, J., concurring and dissent-
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of providing the supporting spouse with a guaranteed return in degree
situations but not in the simpler case of a failed marriage. The court
recognized that when a marriage dissolves, the non-working spouse is
not required to reimburse the working spouse for economic support
provided during the marriage. 75 The non-working spouse's reasons for
not working are immaterial.76
The "economic partnership" and "family investment" approaches to
the marriage institution provide tempting theories to justify equitable
relief in diploma dilemma cases. 7 Serious theoretical and practical
problems associated with the application of these rationale illustrate,
however, that these approaches are more concerned with mending the
working spouse's unfulfilled expectations than with the theories'
soundness. As with the goodwill, tort, and pension analogies, treating
marriage as a strictly financial undertaking is a haphazard process of
backward rationalization in which the court first determines the equita-
ble result and then searches for supporting rationale.
Critics of the economic view argue that it demeans the concept of
marriage, comparing the institution to closely held corporations.78
Courts applying the economic view measure each spouse's contribu-
ing). In Lehmicke the parties were married 13 years before their divorce, although they
had separated nearly seven years earlier. Id. at 783-84. Their separation occurred ap-
proximately one year after the husband's graduation from medical school. Id. at 784.
The wife used her income to support the family and to pay certain educational expenses
for her husband. Id. The husband contributed to his educational expenses through a
loan, a scholarship, and income from research projects. Id. The marital estate at di-
vorce typified the career threshold, no asset situation where few assets had accumulated
during the marriage. At the time of divorce, the wife was a part-time registered nurse
while the husband was a board certified pediatrician in private practice. Id. The trial
court denied the wife alimony but found the husband's medical degree to be marital
property, awarding the wife $64,790. Id. at 783.
75. Id. at 789-90 (Wieand, J., concurring and dissenting).
76. Id. The issue of recovery for one spouse's contributions to another's education
generally occurs only in cases involving a professional degree with high earning poten-
tial, because large sums of money or property are normally at stake. Situations may
exist, however, in which the professional education is incomplete or the student spouse
earned a degree or certificate with minimal earning potential. In fairness to the support-
ing spouse in such cases, statutes should ensure reimbursement to the supporting
spouse, independent of alimony, for her financial contributions to the educational en-
deavor. The proposed statute in the appendix provides this feature.
77. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
78. Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 357, 661 P.2d 196, 207 (Ct. App. 1982). The
court in Pyeatte recognized the economics inherent in the institution of marriage, but
rejected it as grounds for treating the relationship strictly as a financial undertaking.
The larger issue in professional degree cases actually is what constitutes good social
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tions, financial and otherwise, to each other and to the marriage and
then compensate each spouse respectively.79 The court in Wisner v.
Wisner8° disapproved of this theory, stating that courts must not "treat
marriage as an arm's length transaction," permitting a spouse to plead
unjust enrichment when the marriage fails."1 A rebuttable presump-
tion exists, the court noted, that the couple's decision to pursue a de-
gree was mutual and informed regarding expected sacrifices both
would make.82
Perhaps the strongest criticism of the economic partnership theory is
the time-honored belief that marriage is for better or for worse. 83 The
legal duties arising from marriage are unlike those of any business part-
nership agreement. Marriage, one judge aptly observed, "is not en-
tered into with a conscious intent that at some future time there will be
an accounting of and reimbursement for moneys contributed to the
support of the family."84 The law imposes a duty of spousal support
on both spouses.8 5
Implicit in compensatory award theories is a judicial recognition
policy. Because the problem raises social questions, the proper sources for its resolution
are the legislatures.
79. 135 Ariz. at 357, 661 P.2d at 207. In particular, the court refused to attempt to
"strike a balance" between each parties' contribution to the marriage when they had
been married for a number of years. Id. Compare Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d
115, 492 N.E.2d 131 (1986) a case in which the court used a different balancing process
in determining whether a degree was marital property. Without evaluating the propri-
ety of the economic partnership theory, the court saw the challenge as striking a balance
"somewhere between subjecting the husband to a life of professional servitude and leav-
ing the wife in near penury, without sufficient financial resources with which to improve
her station in life," and held that a professional degree was not marital property. Id. at
117, 492 N.E.2d at 133.
80. 192 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981).
81. Id. at 341, 631 P.2d at 123.
82. Id.
83. Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 489 A.2d at 790 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Wieand, J., con-
curring and dissenting). The United States Supreme Court has espoused a similar view,
stating, "Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse ... [The] association
promotes a way of life, not causes; ... a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
84. 489 A.2d at 790. See also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 500, 453 A.2d
527, 533 (1982) ("Marriage is not a business arrangement in which the parties keep
track of debits and credits, their accounts to be settled upon divorce.").
85. 489 A.2d at 790. The Lehmicke concurrence recognized this duty, indicating
that one spouse's compliance with his or her duty does not result in unjust enrichment
to the other, if, for whatever reason, the "enriched" spouse was unable to contribute
familial support. Id.
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that but for the couple's decision to pursue a degree, those measurable
dollars would have been available for other purposes. Absent fraud,
courts may assume that the couple made a mutual decision to have one
spouse work while the other earns a professional degree,86 which pre-
sumably considered the sacrifices and deprivation each spouse expected
to experience. 7 Thus, any award designed to recoup the working
spouse's share of the marriage's opportunity costs in terms of the stu-
dent spouse's lost income and the working spouse's foregone opportu-
nities for enhanced earning capacity is difficult, if not impossible, to
justify. 8
86. See Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 341, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1981).
See also Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 173, 677 P.2d 152, 155 (1984)
(husband and wife mutually decide that one will support the other while the latter ob-
tains a professional degree).
87. Wisner, 129 Ariz. at 341, 631 P.2d at 123. Certainly the family makes a con-
certed effort during the marriage to obtain the degree, with the mutual intent of enhanc-
ing the family's potential earning power. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App.
258, 260-61, 337 N.W.2d 332, 334 (1983). A married couple's decision to spend family
resources to enhance potential family wealth, however, does not provide a basis of re-
covery for unfulfilled expectations. Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Ky. Ct. App.
1982) (right of recovery to marital property is based upon theory of contribution, but it
is impossible for either spouse to contribute to a potential which is not yet and may
never be realized). Upon divorce, all concerted efforts cease and neither spouse can
logically continue to hold the expectations that rested on those past efforts and contri-
butions. Moss, 639 S.W.2d at 370. The degree-holder's earning capacity is personal to
him and leaves with him upon dissolution. See supra notes 31-32, 35-36 and accompa-
nying texts. Contra Note, Treatment of a Professional Degree, supra note 4, at 453-54.
The argument that because the degree is the "end product of a concerted family ef-
fort," the supporting spouse should receive compensation equal to her expectation inter-
est is unpersuasive and contributes nothing towards understanding what is fair in these
cases. This reasoning erroneously presumes that the parties' intentions and expecta-
tions during the marriage remain intact and suddenly become actionable upon dissolu-
tion. Most courts recognize that the supporting spouse's contributions to the education
do not vest her with an in interest in the student spouse's future earnings. See, e.g., In
re Marriage of McManama, 386 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Ruben v.
Ruben, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (N.H. 1983) (supporting spouse has no quantifiable interest
by virtue of contributions toward professional advancement). The significance of the
couple's voluntary assumption of both the costs and the risks inherent in their decision
to allocate family resources is that neither spouse should have a guarantee in divorce to
the unrealized wealth of the other that is better than the mere hope of such wealth that
existed during the marriage. See DeWitt v. DeWitt, 90 Wis. 2d 44, 58, 296 S.W.2d 761,
768 (Ct. App. 1980).
88. See DaLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758-59 (Minn. 1981) (no recov-
ery for foregone income of student spouse). But see Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash.
2d 168, 179-80, 677 P.2d 152, 159 (1984) (student spouse's foregone earnings and sup-
porting spouse's foregone educational or career opportunities are factors to consider
when determining the proper amount of compensation for the supporting spouse). See
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Neither the voluntary nature of the degree decision nor the imposed
duty of spousal support, however, should alone be sufficient to deny the
supporting spouse recoupment of her direct financial contributions to-
wards the student spouse's degree."9 Restitution for these contribu-
tions recognizes two important features of this unique problem. First,
the court is dissolving a marriage, not a formal business partnership in
which records are kept and profits are sought. Second, acquiring an
education requires not only the expenditure of money, but requires also
a certain amount of aptitude and skill that a person arguably possesses
before marriage.9" The degree holder is penalized if an interest in the
degree is divided without considering his non-financial contributions
towards earning it."
This proper view of the common law duty of spousal support dem-
onstrates that a complete assessment and quantitative valuation of each
spouse's individual contributions during the marriage and their expec-
tancies is unworkable and socially unacceptable. Mechanically apply-
ing principles of restitution, implied loan, unjust enrichment and quasi-
contract to a marriage is not only inappropriate but also contrary to
public policy because these theories are based on measurements of
fault.9 2 Placing blame on a spouse or determining whether a spouse
also Spousal Support, supra note 4, at 1002-05 (author advocates focus on disparate
earning capacities between the two spouses resulting from disproportionate allocation of
opportunity costs in order to more equitably reapportion this burden). Accord Note,
Family Sacrifice, supra note 4, at 296-97 (author insists that supporting spouse be al-
lowed to recoup foregone educational opportunities and other non-financial
contributions).
89. The court in Lehmicke recognized the sacrifices of the working spouse and the
reduced standard of living both parties likely experienced during the educational period,
but permitted reimbursement only for amounts advanced in excess of the legal duty of
spousal support. 489 A.2d at 787. The court agreed with the Mahoney "reimbursement
alimony" approach and noted that, although its award was not in the form of alimony,
it was based on the same equitable principles. Id. The proposed statute adopts this
concept.
Under the theory of a legal duty of spousal support, the Lehmicke court implicitly
applied a "but for" approach in determining the extent of reimbursement to the sup-
porting spouse. The student spouse must return to the supporting spouse those funds
that, "but for" the decision to attend school, would have been saved or spent otherwise.
90. See Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 345, 33 A.2d 257, 260 (1975).
91. See Comment, Community Property Interest, supra note 4, at 291.
92. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Compare Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135
Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1982). In Pyeatte the court noted that restitution
traditionally has been available upon either an "implied-in-fact" contract or on a quasi-
contractual basis. Id. at 353, 661 P.2d at 203. To obtain restitution on the basis of an
implied-in-fact contract, the supporting spouse must prove the elements of a binding
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imprudently exhausted assets is not the law's purpose in a divorce
action.
93
D. The Unworkable Consequences of Distributing a Property Interest
in a Professional Degree
1. Impact on Affected Parties' Rights and Obligations
Judges and commentators who favor distributing a portion of the
student spouse's lifetime earnings to the supporting spouse as marital
property give little consideration to other legal ramifications of such an
award. Generally, this action places too much weight on immediate
equity concerns. A property distribution or cash award in lieu of dis-
tribution places the supporting spouse and every judgment creditor of a
debtor spouse in a position to attach and execute against the degree as
property.9 4 In addition, questions arise regarding both the inheritance
rights of the supporting spouse's heirs and the obligation of the student
spouse's estate to honor the divorce decree. 95 Another concern is the
innovative judicial order that the student spouse to maintain a life in-
surance policy for the supporting spouse's benefit to meet any unpaid
award.9 6 This measure guarantees the supporting spouse an income
stream that she may not have had but for the divorce, an income
stream that the degree holder may never earn.97
contract. Id. Restitution, however, is available in quasi-contract without a showing of
mutual assent. Id. The court observed that restitution on the basis of unjust enrich-
ment was inappropriate for purposes of seeking restitution for the value of "usual and
incidental activities of the marital relationship," such as homemaking services. Id. The
court concluded, however, that restitution was appropriate when "the facts demonstrate
an agreement between the spouses and an extraordinary or unilateral effort by one
spouse which inures solely to the benefit of the other by the time of dissolution." Id.
Because the case presented the typical no asset, career-threshold situation, the court
held that equity required restitution to the supporting spouse for her contributions to
the student spouse's living and educational expenses. Id. at 357, 661 P.2d at 207.
93. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 341, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1981).
94. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 227, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (1985).
95. Generally, maintenance awards terminate upon the payor's death. See, e.g.,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(d) (Supp. 1986). Alternatively, a judgment to pay a
property debt such as a supporting spouse's "interest" in the professional degree would
represent a claim against the student spouse's estate, depriving his subsequently formed
family of an inheritance they might otherwise expect. See Note, Treatment of a Profes-
sional Degree, supra note 4, at 440.
96. The trial court in O'Brien v. O'Brien directed the husband to maintain a life
insurance policy on his life in his ex-wife's benefit for the unpaid balance of the award.
114 Misc. 2d 233, 242 (1985).
97. See DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 58, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Ct. App. 1980)
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Awards of a property interest in the student spouse's enhanced earn-
ing capacity consistently exceed mere restitution of the supporting
spouse's contribution because restitution does not satisfy "expectancy."
Yet expectancy is not truly realistic and equitable unless it is subject to
future exigencies that the degree holder might experience, regardless of
whether he remains married. Unexpected events, such as malpractice
claims, diminish the value of the degree.
2. Spousal Contributions That Enhance Unlicensed Careers
If the working spouse's contributions towards the student spouse's
education entitles her to a property interest in his enhanced earning
(superseded by statute as stated in In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318
N.W.2d 918, 922 (1982)) (to award a share of an education's estimated future value as
property is tantamount to awarding a share of something that never existed in any real
sense); but cf Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 503, 453 A.2d 527, 535 (1982) ("mar-
riage should not be a free ticket to professional education... without subsequent obliga-
tion").
Because property awards are not modifiable, a property interest in the student
spouse's future earnings is a "perpetual lien" on the student spouse's future income.
Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982). But see Washburn v. Wash-
burn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 179, 677 P.2d 152, 158 n.3 (1984) (maintenance award not a
"perpetual lien" because it is modifiable to account for circumstantial changes); Lovett
v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Ky. 1985) (adjustable maintenance award preferred
over award of future earnings as marital property).
The few property-based judgments in a professional degree cases have awarded the
difference between the student spouse's earning potential before and after his receipt of
the degree. See supra notes 13-15, 160-61 and accompanying text. No court ordering
such an award has provided for subsequent modification should the student spouse's
career plans change by design or fate. Because a property judgment fails to recognize
the payor spouse's true future ability to pay, it commends him, in effect, to practice a
certain profession and, as one commentator queried, "Is the supporting spouse entitled
to a property settlement that forces the new lawyer to work on Wall Street and give up
his or her public defender's job in order to meet the earnings of the statistically average
lawyers." Mullenix, supra note 4, at 168.
Initially, the idea of the student spouse leaving the marriage with the degree and all
its promise without rewarding the working spouse's efforts appears to constitute a wind-
fall for the student spouse. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 341, 631 P.2d 115, 122
(Ct. App. 1981). From the student spouse's perspective, however, a court ordered
award of his future earnings as marital property is tantamount to granting the support-
ing spouse a guaranteed annuity. The supporting spouse obtains this income entitle-
ment without having to fulfill any future obligations, which she presumably was fully
prepared to continue making in the form of spousal support. Further, such an award
assures the supporting spouse to an interest in the professional's future earnings without
having to share in the financial costs of maintaining the license. For example, in the
case of a medical license, such costs include malpractice premiums, state and federal
license renewal fees, and the expense of obtaining the necessary continuing medical edu-
cation credits.
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capacity, then similar contributions to another spouse's enhanced,
although unlicensed, business career should receive a comparable
award. In Meinholz v. Meinholz9 s a housewife made such a claim. The
wife gave up her ambition to be a counselor and became a homemaker
after she and her husband agreed to work together as a partnership
toward the common goal of establishing his career.99 The court re-
jected her attempt to rely on professional license cases because divorce
in those cases typically occurs just when the increased earnings be-
gin.'00 In the court's view, the wife's case was unlike the professional
license cases because of the couple's accumulation of marital property
and the wife's eligibility for maintenance.' 0 1 The presence of accumu-
lated assets led the court to conclude that the supporting spouse had
already benefited from her husband's increased earning capacity.102
Although Meinholz represents the majority of non-licensed, "en-
hanced business career" cases,103 the rationale presupposes that mate-
rial rewards accumulate commensurately with the couple's joint
efforts. This reasoning is not adaptable to situations in which the bene-
fits from the wife's contributions towards the career are not realized
until after the divorce.
98. 283 Ark. 509, 678 S.W.2d 348 (1984).
99. Id. at 511, 678 S.W.2d at 349. For a brief digest treatment of cases addressing
the value of homemaking services and performance of social obligations for purposes of
maintenance and property division, see Annotation, Divorce-Equitable Distribution, 41
A.L.R.4TH 481, 510-15 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
100. 283 Ark. at 512, 678 S.W.2d at 350.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Courts consistently refuse to find a property interest in the student spouse's
education, degree, license, or earning capacity and refuse to order restitution in favor of
the wife when the couple has accumulated substantial assets. Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135
Ariz. 346, 354, 661 P.2d 196, 204 (Ct. App. 1982). Because those marital assets repre-
sent the product of the education, a distribution of that property to the supporting
spouse allows her to realize her "investment" in the student spouse's education. Id.
See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 358 N.W.2d 793, 799 (S.D. 1984) (reimbursement alimony
not appropriate where supporting spouse has benefited from student spouse's increased
earning capacity); Grosskopfv. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984) (an equitable
division of accumulated property permits each party to realize the benefits of the educa-
tion). See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text for further discussion of the signifi-
cance of accumulated traditional marital property in professional degree cases.
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IV. CRITERIA AND COMPONENTS OF DISSOLUTION AWARDS
A. Relationship Between Property Division and Support Awards
Courts have broad discretion to reach equitable results in dissolution
matters through either property distribution, periodic support pay-
ments, or both."° Courts utilize both in efforts to provide financial
assistance for each spouse.10 5 Under equitable divorce statutes the pre-
ferred method of achieving this goal is through property division,
rather than an award of maintenance or alimony. 10 6 This approach is
also intended to separate the parties' financial affairs and eliminate the
need for further dealings.10 7 Because each party in a professional de-
gree case is usually self-sufficient and few marital assets are available
for division, courts' application of these principles in determining
whether a distributable interest exists in a professional degree involves
questions of fairness rather than need.' 8
104. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 211, 343 N.W.2d 796, 802 (1984). See
also Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 178, 677 P.2d 152, 158 (1984) (trial
court exercises broad discretionary powers in making equitable property division or
awarding maintenance).
105. Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 355, 493 A.2d 1074, 1078 (1985). See also
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747 (1985) (concept of
maintenance allows recipient to achieve economic independence). Cf DeWitt v. De-
Witt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 60, 296 N.W.2d 761, 769 (1980) (same factors relevant to property
division apply to determination of alimony). See generally Annotation, Divorce-Equi-
table Distribution, 41 A.L.R. 4TH 481, 516 (1984) (goal of equitable distribution is to
make the parties self-sufficient).
106. Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 821 (Wyo. 1984).
107. Id. Courts in many states are emphasizing the additional goal of equitably
distributing property in a manner that separates the parties, obviating the need for fur-
ther dealings. See Annotation, Divorce-Equitable Distribution, 41 A.L.R.4TH 481, 491
(1984). The same goal applies to maintenance awards, to enable the parties to plan their
future with certainty. Id. at 492. Distribution of a degree as property frustrates this
goal. The court in O'Brien, however, believed that its approval of a payment schedule
consisting of 11 annual installments to satisfy a property interest distribution of the
professional spouse's degree somehow avoided or minimized "the uncertain and unsuit-
able economic ties of dependence of a maintenance award" 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 748. The court fails to explain how such awards bring any greater finality
to the parties' economic ties than other methods.
108. See, e.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 267-68, 337 N.W.2d
332, 337 (1983) (non-supporting spouse should not be deprived of marriage benefits
even though self-supporting); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 501, 453 A.2d 527,
534 (1982) (supporting spouse should be reimbursed for financial contributions to
other's education regardless of the appropriateness of alimony or absence of marital
property); Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 216, 343 N.W.2d 796, 804 (1984) (sup-
porting spouse can be awarded maintenance for contribution to husband's education
even though not in need).
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
200 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 32:173
B. Judicial Goals in Professional Degree Cases
Most courts generally agree that the overarching goal of dividing
marital property is to determine what equitably belongs to each
spouse.109 Given such general instructions under most divorce stat-
utes, judges in search of an equitable division manufacture a variety of
ill-supported resolutions in professional degree cases. Thus, equity is
primarily a function of intuition or personal philosophy.
Many judges faced with the task of resolving the diploma di-
lemma"o conclude that to ignore the supporting spouse's contributions
and allow the student spouse to experience a "windfall" at divorce is
patently unfair."' The degree and the earning capacity it represents
are, in their view, the most valuable "asset" acquired during the mar-
riage. 112 Consequently, fairness demands compensating the supporting
spouse for her contributions and foregone opportunities while the stu-
dent spouse was in school." 3 After all, proponents of this view insist,
these contributions were part of a concerted effort and not made as a
gift." 4 Such compensation can be achieved, they maintain, through
property payments, alimony, or both." 5
109. In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 76 (Colo. 1978) (purpose of division of
marital property is to allocate what equitably belongs to each spouse); Woodworth v.
Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 269, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983) (fairness is ultimate
objective in a property distribution).
110. See Lovettiv. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Ky. 1985).
111. See Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 207, 343 N.W.2d 796, 800 (1984)(unfair to deny supporting spouse a share in the anticipated earnings while the student
spouse keeps the degree and all the financial rewards it promises). The concept of "un-just enrichment" is similarly used to characterize this situation. Woodworth, 337
N.W.2d at 337. See supra notes 80-107 and accompanying text.
112. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (1985)(husband's newly acquired medical licensee was parties' only asset of any consequence).
113. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 219, 343 N.W.2d 796, 805-06 (1984). See
generally Annotation, Divorce-Equitable Distribution, 41 A.L.R.4TH 481, 509-10(1984 & Supp. 1987) (digest review of cases holding that non-financial contributions to
the marital estate should be considered when making a "equitable" or "just" property
division). See infra notes 121, 175, 210-11 and accompanying texts.
114. See supra note I ll and accompanying text. See also Comment, supra note 33,
at 74. As several commentators have observed, however, it is difficult to characterize
the supporting spouse's contributions as a gift because they are made with the expecta-
tion of yielding future income. Id. n. 163.
115. The court's position in Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796(1984), was that a spouse whose contributions to the marriage and the student spouse's
education have socially and financially handicapped her shall be compensated at termi-
nation of the marriage. Id. at 219, 343 N.W.2d at 805-06. The court took a broad view
of the term "compensation," concluding that Wisconsin's statutes afforded courts
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Although agreeing on the general goal of fairness, courts that apply
property concepts to a professional degree reject compensation as the
correct objective in such cases. Reasoning that mere restitution is a
deficient measure of economic justice, their solution is to give the de-
gree a property label that permits a distributive award to the support-
ing spouse of a percentage in the degree holder's projected lifetime
earnings.' 6  Others, however, find it untenable that a supporting
spouse's contribution to the couple's mutual support for a three or four
year period should entitle her to a large percentage of the speculative
present value of the professional spouse's lifetime earnings.117
enough flexibility to permit it to compensate the supporting spouse not only for her
financial contributions to the education, but also for the opportunity costs resulting
from the student's unemployment. Id. at 213, 343 N.W.2d at 803. For further discus-
sion regarding the awards of opportunity costs, see supra notes 118-21 and accompany-
ing text.
The expansiveness of the court's notion of "compensation" is even more evident given
its approval of three alternative approaches directed at compensating opportunity costs.
The first approach, the cost-value approach, permits compensation not only for the sup-
porting spouse's contributions to the education's direct cost, but also for living expenses
and homemaking services rendered during the marriage. 117 Wis. 2d at 212, 343
N.W.2d at 802. This approach reimburses the wife for all spousal support, imputing
income from homemaking services to the marriage for which she receives credit in the
same manner as direct educational outlays. The second approach "compensates" the
supporting spouse utilizing the present value of the student spouse's enhanced earning
capacity. Id. at 213, 343 N.W.2d at 803. See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying
text. In the final approach, known as the labor theory of value, the trial court may
award the supporting spouse one-half of the student spouse's enhanced yearly earnings
for as many years as the supporting spouse worked to support the student. 117 Wis. 2d
at 214, 343 N.W.2d at 803. For commentary advocating this theory, see Mullenix,
supra note 4.
The phenomenal range of remedial choices in Haugan allows the court to devise
awards that are inconsistent both in terms of their underlying rationale and results.
Such "compensation" assumes dimensions beyond traditional restitution. Awards com-
posed of living expenses and opportunity costs return money to the supporting spouse
for which she otherwise would not expect reimbursement had those funds and efforts
been expended on noneducational endeavors.
116. See Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 190, 677 P.2d at 164 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
But cf In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ii. App. 3d 234, 244, 470 N.E.2d 551, 559
(1984) (because a degree is at most a mere expectancy of some future earnings, it cannot
represent a guarantee receipt of a fixed amount in the future); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf,
677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984) (court is limited in property division to amount of prop-
erty in its hands; mere expectancy is not subject to division) (quoting Storm v. Storm,
470 P.2d 367, 370 (Wyo. 1970)).
117. See Krauskopf, supra note 4, at 414. See supra note 110 and accompanying
text. One weakness of this "equal-sharing-of-benefits: theory concerns its assumption
that each spouse devoted equal amounts of time-her working and his studying-to
attaining the education. Comment, supra note 33, at 86-87. Of the three variables often
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B. Award Components-The Proper Measure of the Supporting
Spouse's Contributions
A degree's debatable qualifications as divisible marital property
presents courts with practical problems identifying the extent of the
supporting spouse's interest in the degree. Regardless of whether the
court adopts a property view, opinions vary as to the proper compo-
nents of an equitable award. 118 Most courts agree that the supporting
spouse should recover at a minimum her share of direct educational
costs." 9 Other courts extend the scope of recovery to contributions
towards living expenses and services rendered during the marriage 20
used to determine the value of the spouses' relative contributions-time, money, or per-
sonal sacrifice-only the money expended provides evidence capable of fair measure-
ment. Only direct financial contributions, therefore, should be compensable. Judicial
consideration of any entitlement the supporting spouse might have in the student
spouse's earning potential is best reserved for determining the duration and amount of
alimony. See Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 123, 492 N.E.2d 131, 138 (1986)(Douglas, J., dissenting) (supporting spouse's recoupment of actual expenditures in-
volves minimal speculation).
118. For a recent review of the various forms of compensation or recovery currently
allowed in or proposed for professional degree cases, see Mullenix, supra note 4, at 261-
83, and Spousal Support, supra note 4, at 282-87.
119. Beeler v. Beeler, 715 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). See also Pyeatte
v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 354-55, 661 P.2d 196, 204-05 (Ct. App. 1982) (emerging
consensus is that "restitution to working spouse is appropriate to prevent the unjust
enrichment of the student spouse"); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891(Iowa 1978) (cost of education is one method to establish value of degree); Moss v.
Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (wife's interest in husband's education
restricted to "amount spent for direct support and school expenses") (quoting from
Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. App. 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d
747, 751 (Okla. 1979) (supporting spouse has right to compensation for amount of di-
rect financial investment in student spouse's education).
120. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 211, 343 N.W.2d 796, 802 (1984). Cf
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 501, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (1982) ("reimbursement
alimony" includes household expenses and "any other contributions used by the sup-
ported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license"); but cf Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135
Ariz. 346, 357, 661 P.2d 196, 207 (Ct. App. 1982) (working spouse's compensable inter-
est in student spouse's education excludes homemaking services and is limited to finan-
cial contributions to living expenses and direct educational expenses).
In a similar but more calculated approach, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in DeLa
Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981), stated that compensation to the
working spouse for "marital support" of the student spouse's education should equal
the working spouse's financial contributions to joint living expenses and the student
spouse's educational costs minus one-half of the difference between the couple's finan-
cial contributions and the cost of education. Id. at 759. Accord Stevens v. Stevens, 23
Ohio St. 3d 115, 125, 492 N.E.2d 131, 139 (1986) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see
Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 179-80, 677 P.2d 152, 159 (1984) (direct
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and the cost of foregone career, employment, or educational
opportunities. 12
1
educational costs do not include living expenses the student spouse incurred, because
such expenses would exist regardless of his pursuit of a professional education).
121. Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 180, 677 P.2d 152, 159 (1984).
Courts favoring this component argue that to permit recovery of educational expenses
but not the cost of foregone opportunities is inconsistent. Id. Rather than grant a sepa-
rate award for this "opportunity cost," courts that allow its recovery generally charac-
terize it as part of the supporting spouse's total contribution to the education, which
entitles her to a proportionate share in the professional spouse's future earnings. See,
e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1985) (statute
directs full consideration of both direct and indirect contributions to acquisition of mar-
ital property, including contributions to career potential of other party).
But cf Beeler v. Beeler, 715 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). Tennessee's divorce
statute directs the court to consider "the tangible or intangible contribution by one
party to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other party" when
fashioning an equitable division of marital property and when awarding support and
maintenance. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-4-121(c)(3), 36-5-101(d)(9) (Supp. 1986). The
Beeler court rejected the property theory and concluded that the working spouse's con-
tribution to the education was just "one factor" to be considered in equitably dividing
the marital estate and awarding alimony. 715 S.W.2d at 627. Although the court did
not address recoupment of opportunity costs, it did affirm an award to the wife of
$1,050 for teaching certification courses. Id.
Courts have not indicated what other opportunity costs are recoverable. Some com-
mentators advocate recoupment of only forfeited earnings. See, e.g., Wife Works So
Husband Can Go to Law School: Should She Be Taken in as a "Partner" When "Esq."
Is Followed by Divorce? or Can You Have a Community Property Interest in a Profes-
sional Education?, 2 COMM. PROP. J. 85, 92 (1975) (author proposes "cost-value" the-
ory that accounts for direct educational expenses and the opportunity cost of earnings
foregone by the student spouse while he was in school). Others, however, believe that
recoupment of educational costs must also include the working spouse's foregone edu-
cational and career opportunities. See, e.g., Spousal Support, supra note 4, at 998, 1002.
Commentators argue that an award that includes reimbursement for both lost earnings
and foregone career and educational opportunities relieves the inequity of the disparate
share of these costs that the working spouse invariably bears. Id. See also Mullenix,
supra note 4, at 269.
Inclusion of the student spouse's foregone income as a compensable opportunity cost
is significant because it may represent as much as 74% of the total investment cost of
acquiring a college education. See Krauskopf, supra note 4, at 384.
Allowing recovery of "opportunity costs" in addition to traditional alimony, like the
economic partnership theory, is inappropriate in the context of marriage because mar-
riage is for "better or worse." Estimating the amount of foregone income requires the
courts to engage in troublesome speculation similar to that experienced when estimating
the value of future income streams, particularly when a wage history prior to the com-
mencement of the professional education does not exist. To the extent that the court
overestimates the foregone income, the supporting spouse will be unjustly enriched.
Inclusion in an award of the opportunity costs of lost career or educational opportu-
nities is also problematic because the court must determine the legitimacy of the oppor-
tunity, the value of the opportunity, and whether it was passed up because of the
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1. Reimbursement Alimony
A popular innovation developed to remedy the diploma dilemma is
"reimbursement alimony." 22 The New Jersey Supreme Court first in-
troduced this concept in Mahoney v. Mahoney.12 3 In Mahoney the wife
sought one-half of all financial support she gave her husband while he
obtained his M.B.A. degree. 124 The court declined to treat a profes-
sional degree as divisible marital property.1 2 5 The court also rejected
the commercial enterprise concept of marriage and, therefore, did not
condone reimbursement between former spouses.' 2 6 The court empha-
sized fairness, however, and held that individuals who receive financial
support from their spouse to pursue professional training can expect to
be forced to reimburse the supporting spouse for these contributions. 127
Supporting spouses who qualify for reimbursement alimony receive
all financial contributions to the student spouse for educational pur-
poses.128 Reimbursement alimony is not an absolute right, however, of
every spouse who contributes towards her partner's education. 2 9
Under the Mahoney test, the award is limited to "monetary contribu-
tions made with the mutual and shared expectation that both parties to
the marriage will derive increased income and material benefits .... ", 30
Reimbursement alimony is inappropriate in two situations. First, if the
couple accumulated substantial assets during the marriage, the sup-
decision for one party to pursue a professional education. Many courts recognize that
the working spouse has a desire at the time of divorce to pursue higher education with a
view to a professional career of her own and thereby permit an award or additional
alimony to finance such rehabilitation. Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 120-21,
492 N.E.3d 131, 135-36 (1986). See also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 502-04,
453 A.2d 527, 534-35 (1982) (rehabilitative alimony appropriate when supporting
spouse is not self-sufficient or is unable to return to job market).
The proposed statute adopts the concept of "rehabilitative alimony" rather than an
award of the "cost" of foregone opportunities, which may not be confirmed. The ad-
vantage of such an award is that its legitimacy is objectively determined from the work-
ing spouse's expressed desire at the time of dissolution to pursue a definite course of
education or training.
122. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 500, 453 A.2d at 533.
123. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
124. Id. at 493, 453 A.2d at 529-30.
125. Id. at 496-97, 453 A.2d at 532.
126. Id. at 500, 453 A.2d at 533.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534.
129. Id. at 502, 453 A.2d at 535.
130. Id. at 502-03, 453 A.2d at 535.
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porting spouse already realized the benefits of the increased earning
capacity she helped finance.13 1 Second, reimbursement alimony is in-
appropriate if the supporting spouse is financially self-sufficient or is
unable to return to the job market. 132
One major shortfall of the Mahoney theory of reimbursement ali-
mony is that the propriety of reimbursing the supporting spouses is not
determined independently of conventional alimony or property divi-
sion. 133 The court expressed a preference for an equitable distribution
131. Id. at 504, 453 A.2d at 535-36.
132. Consistent with Mahoney, many judges feel that reimbursement for the sup-
porting spouse's contributions to the student spouse's education and an award of tradi-
tional support or alimony are not mutually exclusive. See, e.g., Stevens v. Stevens, 23
Ohio St. 3d 115, 126, 492 N.E.2d 141, 140 (1986) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Under the
"relevant factor" scheme of most divorce statutes, the appropriateness of alimony de-
pends partially on the amount awarded to the contributing spouse as reimbursement for
her contributions to the other spouse's education. Id. Nor is restitution or reimburse-
ment alimony considered mutually exclusive from a rehabilitative award. See Saint-
Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 261 (S.D. 1984) ("rehabilitative alimony" may
be more appropriate than reimbursement alimony if supporting spouse requires money
to become self-sufficient or improve or refresh her job skills).
The reimbursement award provided for in the proposed statute expressly incorporates
a feature that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania emphasized in Lehmicke v. Lehmicke
when compensating the supporting spouse, stating that the award is not an alimony
award. 489 A.2d 782, 786 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Although the proposed statute rejects
a characterization of its award as traditional alimony for purposes of maintenance or
support, it retains an "alimony" label solely for purposes of being eligible for advantages
that such a classification has over a property distribution award. For example, one such
advantage is that, unlike a marital property distribution, alimony is non-dischargeable
in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1986). The Bankruptcy Code defines non-dis-
chargeable items, in part, as debts owed "to a ... former spouse ... in connection with
a separation agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of record ... ." Id.
But see Note, Treatment of a Professional Degree, supra note 4, at 437 ("court's descrip-
tion of the award as a right to receive a sum certain and its protection of the award
against termination would probably cause a federal tax or bankruptcy court to identify
the award as property, despite the state court's choice of label").
133. 91 N.J. at 504, 453 A.2d at 535-36. The supporting spouse's right to compen-
sation should not depend on the court's ability to otherwise distribute existing marital
property or award alimony or other forms of support. See Comment, supra note 33, at
84-85.
The primary function of alimony is to provide for the other spouse's support. Wood-
worth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 267, 337 N.W.2d 332, 336 (1983). Whether
the supporting spouse needs support or not, she is entitled to compensation for her
contributions to the student spouse's education. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200,
216, 343 N.W.2d 796, 804 (1984); Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 178-79,
677 P.2d 152, 158 (1984) (demonstrated capacity of self-support does not automatically
preclude award of maintenance. See also Comment, supra note 33, at 84.
Nor should the supporting spouse's right to compensation for her financial contribu-
tions to the student spouse's education be conditioned on her subsequent marital status.
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of assets over reimbursement alimony if the degree holder's enhanced
earning capacity has been sufficiently realized in the form of prop-
erty."3 4 The Model Statute rejects this concept, specifically providing
for reimbursement of the supporting spouse's direct financial contribu-
tions to the student spouse's education exclusive of any other awards of
property or alimony.
Another key disadvantage of the Mahoney design of reimbursement
alimony, also rejected by the Model Statute, is that it is not available if
the marriage endured long enough to accumulate sufficient assets, or if
the supporting spouse is either unable to return to the job market or is
financially self-sufficient. 135 Conditions on reimbursement require ad-
ditional evidence and further judicial discretion regarding how much
accumulated wealth is enough or how self-sufficient the supporting
spouse must be before she is no longer entitled to reimbursement.136
None of the exceptions are logically related to the concept of reim-
bursement if their true purpose is reimbursement. 137
Restitution ignores the supporting spouse's non-financial contribu-
tions and fails to meet her hard-earned expectancy of participating in
the student spouse's enhanced earning capacity. 138 Most courts favor-
ing distribution of a professional degree as property reject such awards.
Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 125, 492 N.E.2d at 139 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The pro-
posed statute incorporates this principle.
134. The court in Mahoney initially appeared to approve of making "reimbursement
alimony" available independent of traditional alimony and equitable distribution. The
court stated, however, that "[r]eimbursement alimony should not subvert the basic
goals of traditional alimony and equitable distribution." 91 N.J. 488, 503, 453 A.2d
527, 534 (1982). Cf Comment, The Equity-Property Dilemma, "supra note 4, at 1028,
1033 (author advocates ability of working spouse to make an independent claim for
reimbursement alimony as an alternative to a claim for a community property interest
in the degree).
135. 91 N.J. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535.
136. See Note, Excluding Educational Degrees, supra note 4, at 1352.
137. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (5th ed. 1979) ("reimburse" means "[t]o
pay back, to make restoration, to repay that expended; to indemnify or make whole").
Many commentators feel that reimbursing the working spouse for her financial ex-
penditures is the fairest solution. See Note, Excluding Educational Degrees, supra note
4, at 1338-40. The author summarizes five principal arguments commentators have
advanced in support of a restitutionary approach. These arguments include: (1) equity
demands restitution to prevent unjust enrichment; (2) restitution avoids speculation of a
degree's value; (3) restitution avoids division of the student spouse's post-divorce earn-
ings; (4) property-based distribution of a degree denies the degree-holder freedom of
choosing a particular career; and (5) restitution is appropriate because the divorce pre-
vented the wife from financially benefiting from her contributions to the education. Id.
138. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 219, 343 N.W.2d 796, 805 (1984). See
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Ironically, both views seek to prevent unjust enrichment of the student
spouse.139  Without precise statutory provisions, however, judicial
opinions of how much compensation is just, equitable, or fair will con-
tinue to vary.1 4°
D. Doctrinal Solutions and Their Criteria
1. Relevant Factor Doctrine-Discretionary Chaos
Rather than provide a precise restitutionary award or property divi-
sion, the majority of state legislatures has chosen to treat the support-
ing spouse's contributions towards an advanced degree as a "relevant
factor" in making a just award of alimony or equitable marital prop-
erty division."4 This appealing approach is consistent with the tradi-
tional preference of vesting divorce courts with broad discretion.
14 2
Such flexibility, however, is ill-suited for reaching predictable, consis-
tent results in professional degree cases. Given a statutory license to
subjectively evaluate the supporting spouse's contributions, courts pro-
duce innovative awards ranging from compensation limited to a share
of the education's direct financial costs to a percentage of the student
spouse's enhanced lifetime earnings. 143 The "relevant factor" doctrine
permits a property-minded court to award the supporting spouse her
also Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 268, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983)
(restitution prevents supporting spouse from realizing expected benefit of career).
139. Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 268, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337
(1983) (treating degree as a gift unjustly enriches degree-holder to the extent that its
value exceeds its cost); Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 354, 661 P.2d 196, 204 (Ct.
App. 1982) (essence of restitution is to prevent unjust enrichment of one spouse at ex-
pense of another).
140. See Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 123, 492 N.E.2d 131, 137 (1986)
(Wright, J., concurring) ("the lack of clarity" in Ohio's statute made it difficult to inter-
pret legislative intent with respect to professional degree cases). See also Spousal Sup-
port, supra note 4, at 1001 (author recognizes the judiciary's inability to define objectives
clearly).
141. See, e.g., the statutes construed in Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d
115 (Ct. App. 1981); In re Marriage of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr.
796 (1982); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981);
Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1985); Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 733 (N.H.
1983); Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 492 N.E.2d 131 (1986); Beeler v. Beeler,
715 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). Contra Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich.
App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983) (equitable distribution between the parties upon dis-
solution was court's only concern).
142. See supra notes 3, 105 and accompanying text.
143. For recent examples of the judiciary's recognition and review of the plethora of
approaches and remedies to this problem, see Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 352-54,
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"share" of the other spouse's degree disguised as conventional alimony
or through traditional property division.
2. Reaped Benefits Doctrine
Perhaps the dominant factor for courts analyzing the diploma di-
lemma is the extent to which the supporting spouse has already real-
ized the benefits of her partner's enhanced earning capacity."4 When
the marriage has endured beyond the launch of the professional
spouse's career, a substantial marital estate often has been accumu-
lated. In these cases, regardless of their beliefs regarding the property
concept of a professional degree, courts prefer to utilize traditional
awards of property division and maintenance to ensure that the non-
degree holder's expectations are realized.' 45 The threshold determina-
tion is whether enough marital assets have accumulated at the time of
divorce to finance the amount of compensation the court envisions.146
493 A.2d 1074, 1077-78 (Ct. App. 1985) and Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d
168, 174-76, 677 P.2d 152, 155-565 (1984).
144. See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 354-57, 661 P.2d 196, 204-07 (Ct.
App, 1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 588-89, modified, 489 N.E.2d 712, 718,
498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1985).
One reason for treating a degree as divisible marital property is that such treatment
will discourage the degree-holding spouse from seeking divorce early in his professional
career. Note, Excluding Educational Degrees, supra note 4, at 1334. The professional
spouse will postpone divorce until the couple accumulates traditional assets sufficient
for an "equitable distribution." Id. The application of this argument in the context of a
hopelessly broken marriage is dubious. A supporting spouse faced with a broken mar-
riage is unlikely to postpone filing for divorce if her jurisdiction permits an equitable
distribution of the professional spouse's future earnings as part of the marital property.
145. See, e.g., Meinholz v. Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 512, 678 S.W.2d 348, 350
(1984); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 502-03, 453 A.2d 1062, 1065 (1982);
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, modified, 489 N.E.2d 712, 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d
743, 749 (1985) (court has discretion to distribute other marital assets in lieu of actual
distribution of the value of professional spouse's license); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d
44, 56-57, 296 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Ct. App. 1980) (compensation otherwise available
through cash award in lieu of conventional property distribution not necessary when
non-degree holder has already realized benefit from her investment in other's earning
capacity); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984). Commentators
have pointed out that this "accumulated asset" distinction permits judges to avoid the
issue of whether the supporting spouse has a property interest in the degree. See, e.g.,
Mullenix, supra note 4, at 242, 246, 250 ("[tjhese decisions are confusing, evasive, un-
principled, and unfair" because "awards to the supporting spouse often contain dis-
guised compensation for contributions to the student spouse, without expressly stating
that the award is a distinction of property"). Note, Family Sacrifice, supra note 4, at
279 n.21, 280 n.31.
146. Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Ky. 1985). The court in Lovett would
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Two primary criticisms of this approach exist. First, it limits distri-
bution of the estimated value of the degree to career-threshold, non-
asset situations. 147 Working spouses who supported student spouses
through school are entitled to a share of the student spouse's lifetime
earnings, while equally supportive non-professional spouses will not
participate in those earnings depending on the duration of the marriage
and the couple's ability to accumulate marital assets. This approach
obligates courts to arbitrarily determine when enough marital property
is accumulated for the supporting spouse to realize the "fruits" of her
efforts. When the marriage's net worth surpasses this arbitrary bound-
ary, no compensation is needed and the professional degree can be ex-
cluded from property distribution. 1
48
The second criticism is that accumulation of traditional marital as-
sets is irrelevant in determining whether a degree is divisible marital
property. When the professional spouse has practiced his profession
long enough to accumulate some judicially prescribed minimum
amount of assets, courts can avoid the issue of whether the supporting
spouse has an equitable interest in a degree.' 4 9 Equitable results are
resolve the "diploma dilemma" through a case-by-case determination of what effect the
professional education experience had on the standard of living established during the
marriage. Id. at 333. Once the standard of living and the non-professional spouse's
ability to support herself are determined, the court can assess the propriety size, and
duration of a maintenance award. Id. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
147. Note, Excluding Educational Degrees, supra note 4, at 1350. See, eg., Inman
v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (if little or no accumulated marital
property at time of divorce, only way to achieve equitable result is to treat degree as
distributable property). See also Comment, supra note 33, at 76 n.169 (courts more apt
to find property interest in career-threshold, no asset marriage).
148. The accumulated assets distinction is one illustration of the backward rational-
ization process that courts use to reach the "equitable" result they have in mind. One
commentator has, in fact, described the process as one in which the courts first look to
the facts to determine whether enough marital assets exist; if sufficient marital property
is found, characterization of the degree as property is not necessary to achieve the de-
sired result. Mullenix, supra note 4, at 242.
The inherent arbitrary nature of this case-by-case approach results in an unacceptable
degree of conflict and inconsistency in awards. Id. at 250. As one commentator noted,
because the "[c]ourts are, in all probability, incapable of drawing an equitable cut-off
line.., it will be nearly impossible to set a standard of how much marital property is
enough before the [supporting spouse] is 'fully compensated' and the professional li-
cense can therefore be excluded from property distribution." Note, Excluding Educa-
tional Degrees, supra note 4, at 1350.
149. Note, Excluding Educational Degrees, supra note 4, at 1350. The accumula-
tion of conventional distributable marital assets should not be a factor in determining
what form of relief is most equitable in professional degree cases. Lynn v. Lynn, 7 Fain.
L. Rep. (BNA) 3001, 3005, 3006 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980).
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impossible under this arbitrary rule when the divorce occurs before the
professional has a chance to ply his trade.
3. Timing of Asset Acquisition
Another way courts approach the degree dilemma is by distinguish-
ing property or income acquired after the marriage from property ac-
quired during the marriage. Courts in both community property 50
and equitable distribution 5 ' states are obligated to draw this distinc-
tion under statutes that restrict distribution to property acquired dur-
ing the marriage. 152 Under this distinction, two categories of marital
150. Eight states utilize a community property system. The husband and wife own
in common property acquired during the marriage, each having an undivided one-half
interest. Four of the eight states, California, Idaho, Louisiana, and New Mexico, pro-
vide for an equal division of property. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5104 (West 1970); IDAHO
CODE § 32-906 (Supp. 1982); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2335 (West 1985); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-3-8B (1978). The remaining four states, Arizona, Nevada, Texas and Wash-
ington, provide for an "equitable" but not necessarily equal division. See ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1976); NEv. REv. STAT. § 123.220 (1979); TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 5.01(b) (Vernon 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1982).
For a thorough survey and comparative analysis of treatment of professional degrees
in both community property and equitable distribution states, see Loeb & McCann,
Dilemma vs. Paradox: Valuation of an Advanced Degree Upon Dissolution of a Mar-
riage, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 495 (1980); see also Note, Excluding Educational Degrees,
supra note 4, at 1327.
151. Thirty-nine states are "equitable distribution" states. See, eg., ALA. CODE
§ 30-4-19 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 09.555.210(6) (1975 & Supp. 1982); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (1973 & Supp.
1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(a) (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a)
(1974); FLA. STAT. § 61-14 (1975 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-105 (1967 &
Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(d) (Supp. 1981); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 552.23 (1) (Supp. 1982-82); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452-330.1 (Vernon Supp. 1982); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Supp. 1982). The basic premise of this system is that contem-
porary marriage should be regarded, for economic and property purposes, as a partner-
ship of co-equals. See Note, Excluding Educational Degrees, supra note 4, at 1327 n.2.
See also Comment, The Equity-Property Dilemma, supra note 4, at 992 n.7 (partner-
ship principles guide both community property and equitable distribution systems). At
divorce, marital property acquired during marriage should be distributed equitably be-
tween the spouses pursuant to the state's criteria. Other economic incidents of the mari-
tal partnership, like alimony, should be determined on the basis of actual need and
ability to pay. Id.
The remaining three states are strict title, or common law states in which courts
award property on the basis of the name on the title. Only jointly owned property,
therefore, is distributable upon divorce. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (Supp. 1982);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law Co-op 1976); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-16 (1980).
152. See In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668,
678 (1979) (under a community property statute, assets resulting from income for pro-
fessional services would be property acquired after the marriage); Archer v. Archer, 303
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property exist: community and separate. Community property in-
cludes all property that either spouse acquired during the marriage. 53
Property acquired before or after the marriage or during the marriage
by descent, bequest, devise, or gift is a spouse's separate property.1
54
The common rationale for refusing to classify a professional as mari-
tal property in community property jurisdictions appears in In re Mar-
riage of Aufmuth. 55 The court recognized that a legal education's
value lies in the degree holder's future earning capacity,, which is de-
pendent upon a host of factors.1 56 Characterizing a degree as a marital
asset would require division of post-dissolution earnings which, by defi-
nition, are the separate property of the professional spouse. 157 Com-
munity interest exists only in property acquired during the marriage. '
58
To assign a community interest in the value of the post-marital earn-
ings of either spouse is inconsistent with this philosophy.' 59
Aufmuth's community versus separate property distinction plainly
demonstrates the impropriety of the economic partnership concept of
marriage. The distinction recognizes that the true value of a profes-
sional degree is derived exclusively from the future efforts of its holder,
as well as a host of unforeseeable events. Both the economic theory
and reality of professional degree cases indicate that the degree's un-
Md. 347, 358, 493 A.2d 1074, 1080 (1985) (under equitable distribution statute, income
earned after the marriage as a result of the degree does not constitute "marital prop-
erty," because it is not acquired during the marriage); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44,
59, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1980) (division based on valuation of educational degree
"necessarily involves a 'division' of post-divorce earnings" for which no statutory au-
thority exists).
153. See Vaughan, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transac-
tions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 43 (1967). Under the community property system, courts
often analogize marriage to a business partnership. The author comments that marital
property, like partnership property, should further the success and well being of the
partnership. Id..
154. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107-5108 (West 1970).
155. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
156. Id. at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. See also Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 358, 493 A.2d 1074, 1080 (1985)
(professional income earned after marriage dissolution is not marital property because it
would not have been acquired during the marriage); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44,
59, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1980) (granting such a property interest awards the other
party property in excess of the marital estate's net value, creating a "lien" on future
earnings); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 821 (Wyo. 1984) ("one spouse should
not have a perpetual claim on the earnings of the other").
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
212 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 32:173
determinable value, if and when received, more appropriately and more
fairly belongs to the degree holder.
V. VALUATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL DEGREE FOR A
DISTRIBUTIVE AWARD
A. The Discount Valuation Method
Most judges and commentators who advocate distributing a profes-
sional degree as marital property favor the discounted present value
method for estimating the value of the degree holder's earning capac-ity.' 60 Under this method, the total value of the professional spouse's
enhanced lifetime earnings, whether received immediately or in install-
ments, constitutes the degree's "value" subject to division. To deter-
mine the present value of the degree holder's "enhanced earning
capacity," experts first estimate the excess amount of income that the
average professional in the degree holder's field would earn over the
average income of what he would have earned without the degree.
Utilizing the estimated years remaining in the professional's expected
working life, the experts then discount the excess amount at a selected
interest rate. This converts the professional's future income stream
into its present value. 16' A percentage of this discounted stream of
income is awarded to the supporting spouse based on her contributions
to the education and the marriage.
This method is based on significant assumptions that make its use in
distributive awards ludicrous. First, courts face the problematic pro-
cess of determining what the statistically average professional and non-
professional might earn in their lifetimes. Tremendous speculation
permeates these average income estimates, which the student spouse
may never achieve.' 62 Even if reasonably supportable averages were
available, the present value method's comparison of professional school
graduates with bachelor degrees is fallible. The Mahoney court recog-
nized this flaw when it noted that a person of the caliber to complete
professional training would probably be equally productive in an alter-
160. For applications of the present value method, see Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.
2d 200, 213-14, 343 N.W.2d 796, 803 (1984); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich.
App. 258, 269, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983); Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d
168, 191-93, 677 P.2d 152, 165 (1984) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
161. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 118, 492 N.E.2d 131, 133
(1986).
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native career.1 6 3
The method also utilizes a discount rate representing the fixed rate of
return that the supporting spouse expects to earn on her contributions
over the remaining work life of her ex-husband. A higher rate means a
lower discounted present value, while a lower rate causes the profes-
sional spouse to pay more. The rate cannot be renegotiated to reflect
future economic realities, because property awards are traditionally not
modifiable. 164
The many variables and calculations required under the discounted
present value method make its application in dissolution proceedings
particularly inappropriate. The distribution of an item whose value is
determined entirely from forecasts and assumptions eludes both fair
and realistic results. State legislatures must provide the courts with
precise guidelines for judicial analyses. Absent a legislative solution,
awards in recognition of a supporting spouse's contributions will con-
tinue to be a function of economic forecasts and personal judicial views
rather than objective legal rules and principles.
VI. DETERMINING WHAT IS EQUITABLE
A. The Emerging View-Analytical Progress But
No Remedial Consensus
One point agreed upon by all courts in diploma dilemma cases is that
equity, justice, and fairness must be the guiding principles in fashioning
relief.16 5 Court opinions, however, reveal that no meaningful consen-
sus exists on how those goals are best achieved. An emerging view
163. 91 N.J. 488, 498, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (1982). See also O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106
A.D.2d 223, 230, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 553 (1985) (the professional spouse may even earn
less from his professional practice than he could have earned from non-professional
work).
164. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 498, 505, 453 A.2d 527, 532, 536
(1982). See also Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 179 n.3, 677 P.2d 152, 158
n.3 (1984) (court emphasized that permitting supporting spouse to be compensated
through maintenance award avoided subjecting the student spouse to any form of invol-
untary servitude in which he would be forced to work at the chosen profession against
his will).
165. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979), illustrates how a court
often depicts the situation in a professional degree case: "[T]his case presents broad
questions of equity and natural justice which cannot be avoided on such narrow
grounds." For similar enunciations of equity, justice and fairness, see In re Marriage of
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (1978) (Carrigan, J., dissenting); DeLa
Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 1981); Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d
17, 22, 318 N.W.2d 358, 360 (1982). See also Mullenix, supra note 4, at 233.
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recognizes that whether a professional degree has the qualities of com-
mon-law property or not is irrelevant. 66 Instead, the courts' sole con-
cern must be how to equitably divide between the parting spouses
assets held at dissolution. 67 Even though a growing number of courts
on both sides of the "degree-as-property" issue share this emerging
view, their choices of remedies remain diverse.1 68 This emerging view
offers no greater remedial consistency, because courts continue to cast
their relief in maintenance or property distribution forms, both of
which have very different purposes and consequences.1 69
1. A New Species of Divisible Property?
Although the emerging view eliminates courts' confusing preoccupa-
tion with a professional degree's proper label, it gives them even greater
freedom to determine what remedy is equitable. For example, some
judges who advocate a property-oriented award argue that the concept
of marital property is purely a statutory creation that encompasses all
acquisitions of the marriage, material or otherwise.170 The result is a
"new species of property previously unknown at common law or under
prior statutes." 7 ' Others reject this fiction and hold that a profes-
166. The Michigan Court of Appeals in Woodworth v. Woodworth aptly noted that
whether or not a degree "can physically or metaphysically be defined as 'property' is
beside the point." 126 Mich. App. 258, 262, 337 N.W.2d 332, 335 (1983).
167. Id.
168. Despite its declaration that the definition of a degree as property or non-prop-
erty is irrelevant, the Woodworth court awarded the supporting spouse a percentage
share of the present value of the degree holder's future earnings. Id. at 265, 337 N.W.2d
at 337. Cfi Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 181, 677 P.2d 158, 160-61
(1984) (concerned with fairness but not the particular label applied to the award, the
court approved of an award that compensated the supporting spouse for her contribu-
tion to student spouse's educational costs).
169. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 182, 677 P.2d at 161.
170. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 236, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 558 (1985)
(Thompson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thompson noted that
in the search for a fair and just division of the marriage's assets, exclusive reliance upon
conventional concepts of property is "unnecessary and unrealistic." Id. The New York
Court of Appeals elaborated on this point, emphasizing that marital property cannot
"fall within the traditional property concepts because there is no common-law property
interest remotely resembling marital property." 66 N.Y.2d 576, 583, 489 N.E.2d 712,
715 (1985).
171. 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 717. Under this "new property" concept,
employment and work-related benefits are principal forms of wealth that can be appor-
tioned at divorce according to the court's discretion. Note, Treatment of a Professional
Degree, supra note 4, at 441-45. See also Comment, supra note 33, at 70-71 (author
emphasizes that the new property concept is particularly important in divorce because
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sional degree can never be property, either at common law or by stat-
ute.172 The positions that the New York Court of Appeals and one of
that state's appellate division courts recently took in O'Brien v.
O'Brien typify these sharply opposed views.
In O'Brien v. O'Brien the husband left his teaching job to attend
medical school full time, allowing him to earn his medical license two
months prior to his wife's commencement of the divorce action.
173
Throughout the marriage, the wife was employed as a parochial school
teacher and performed most of the household work.1 74 The wife testi-
fied that because of the couple's decision to pursue the medical educa-
tion, she was unable to earn the additional credits needed to obtain a
permanent teaching certificate, with which she could have doubled her
teaching salary. 175 The trial court found the medical degree and li-
cense to be divisible marital property and concluded that the wife had
contributed seventy-six percent of the parties' total income to the mar-
earning capacities are often worth much more than the tangible assets of the marriage).
Recent commentary suggests that the new property theory justifies equitable distribu-
tion of "career assets" as marital property. See Note, Treatment of a Professional De-
gree, supra note 4, at 441-43 (as a "career asset," the value of the professional spouse's
career should be included among the new forms of divisible marital property).
The theory, however, adds no consistency or predictability to the analysis or possible
results in professional degree cases. The theory still encourages inappropriate compari-
sons of professional degrees with goodwill or pension benefits. In addition, one com-
mentator supporting the classification of a degree as a new form of property pointed to
the United States Supreme Court's recognition of a due process property interest in
public education. Note, Treatment of a Professional Degree, supra note 4, at 442 (citing
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)). See also Comment, The Equity-Property Di-
lemma, supra note 4, at 1020-21. Any attempt to analogize a constitutionally protected
property interest and divisible marital property not only distorts their respective values
but ignores their different legal underpinnings and further illustrates the doctrinal chaos
in professional degree cases.
172. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 233, 225, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (1985). In
O'Brien both parties were school teachers at the time of their marriage. 489 N.E.2d at
714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744-45. The husband left his teaching job to complete one year of
pre-medical courses and then attend medical school full time for four and one-half years
while his wife worked. Id. Both parties and their families contributed to the educa-
tional and living expenses incurred during the marriage. Id. The husband then com-
pleted his one year residency in internal medicine. Id. Two months before the wife
commenced action for divorce, the husband gained his license to practice medicine. At
the time of trial, the husband had completed his first year of residency in general sur-
gery. Id.
173. 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744-45.
174. Id.
175. 106 A.D.2d at 234,485 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (Thompson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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riage, exclusive of a loan her spouse had obtained.17 6 After considering
the life style that the wife would have enjoyed from the husband's en-
hanced earning capacity, the court made a distributive award that rep-
resented forty percent of the license's determined value.177 The court
also directed the husband to maintain a life insurance policy on his life
for any unpaid balance of the award. 178
The appellate court rejected the trial court's proposition that New
York's equitable distribution statute authorized a distributive award of
the student's future earnings as marital property. 179 The court noted
that the legislature did not suggest that one spouse's contributions to
the other's career potential entitle her to a legally cognizable claim in
the former spouse's future labors.180 Rather than vest the supporting
spouse with an equitable interest in non-existent property, the court
observed, the legislature chose to provide the supporting spouse with
an award for sufficient maintenance and rehabilitation.181 On appeal,
the New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate court's decision,
sharply disagreeing with the court's construction of New York's Do-
mestic Relations Law.'8 2 O'Brien provides a controversial illustration
of the diploma dilemma and how two courts reached sharply disparate
results while applying the same statute to the same facts.
The Court of Appeals believed that New York's legislature deliber-
ately went beyond traditional property concepts and made marital
property a statutory creature. 183 The statute's definition of "marital
property," concluded the court, recognizes that each spouse has an eq-
uitable claim to "things of value" acquired during the marriage.' 8 4
176. 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
177. Id. Although at the time of trial the husband was not eligible to practice as a
surgeon, the trial court computed the present value of his license based on the average
projected income of a practicing surgeon. 106 A.D.2d at 224 n. 1, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 549
n. 1.
178. 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
179. 106 A.D.2d at 224-27, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550-52.
180. Id. at 224-26, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550-51.
181. Id. at 231-33, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 554-55.
182. 489 N.E.2d at 716-17, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747-48.
183. Id. at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47. Explaining the phenomena of an intangible
item's ability to transform into divisible marital property, the court noted: "[Marital
property] is a statutory creature, is of no meaning whatsoever during the normal course
of marriage and arises full-grown, like Athena, upon the signing of a separtion agree-
ment or the commencement of a matrimonial action." Id..
184. Id.
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New York's statute requires consideration of one spouse's contribu-
tions to another's profession or career in determining an equitable dis-
tribution of property.' Unlike the appellate division majority, which
saw this requirement as an equivocal after-thought, 86 the State Court
of Appeals interpreted it as a clear indication that an interest in a pro-
fession or professional career potential is "marital property."' 87 The
court further noted that the legislature had replaced the common-law
title theory of property distribution' 88 with an equitable distribution
scheme, which recognizes marriage as an economic partnership."' s
The court reasoned, the legislature intended to consider spousal contri-
butions as an investment in a partnership effort that produced the pro-
fessional license.' 9° The court concluded that the professional license
185. Section 236 of New York's Domestic Relations Law provides in part:
In determining an equitable disposition of property .... the court shall consider:
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the
acquisition of marital property b' the party not having title, including joint ef-
forts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse... and to the
career or career potential of the other party....
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest
in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retain-
ing such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the
other party.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(6), (9) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
In its determination of the amount and duration of maintenance, the court is required
to consider the same factors. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236(B)(8)(a) (McKinney Supp.
1983-84). The statute's language also persuaded the court that the legislature had rec-
ognized the courts' inability to alienate the professional degree without due process of
law and, therefore, provided for an award in lieu of its actual distribution. 489 N.E.2d
at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
186. 106 A.D.2d at 225-28, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 551-52.
187. 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
188. Under the common law title approach to marital property distribution, title
alone determines distribution. The five states maintaining this system of distribution are
Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. Freed & Foster, Di-
vorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as ofAugust 1, 1980, 6 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 4043,
4051 (1980). Because this scheme prohibits distribution of a party's separate property
at divorce, the court in Severs v. Severs, 426 So. 2d 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
denied the working spouse any recovery for her contributions to her spouse's law de-
gree. Id. at 994. For a concise discussion comparing the three distinct approaches to
property distribution, see Comment, The Equity-Property Dilemma, supra note 4, at
995-98. See also Annotation, Divorce-Equitable Distribution, 41 A.L.R.4TH 481, 484-
87 (1984) (compares scope of courts' powers under equitable distribution and commu-
nity property theories).
189. 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
190. Id.
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should be considered marital property191 even though it had no market
value. 192
The New York Court of Appeals' reasoning is both flawed and con-
fusing in several respects. First, the court recognized that the license's
ability to fit traditional property concepts is irrelevant, but then in-
sisted that the statute creates a "new species of property." 193 Second,
though the court's definition of this "new property" included "things
of value" acquired during the marriage, 194 the court granted the work-
ing spouse a distributive award in the "present value" of an income
stream that would not be earned until after the divorce.1 95 Finally, the
court found the belief that the parties' economic affairs should be final-
ized and severed through an equitable distribution of marital prop-
erty' 96 consistent with both the equitable distribution theory and its
view of marriage as an economic partnership. Characterizing marriage
as an "economic partnership," however, distorts the parties' true rela-
tionship and realistic mutual expectations, and a fixed cash award pay-
able in annual installments is inconsistent with the goal of severing the
parties' economic ties.' 97
VII. PROPOSED GUIDELINES AND MODEL STATUTE
O'Brien illustrates that state legislatures have not precisely addressed
the diploma dilemma, eliminating all but one interpretation that af-
fords predictable relief. Until a remedial statutory scheme provides an
191. Id.
192. Id. at 717, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 748. In a New York case decided after O'Brien, the
Supreme Court of Nassau County in Vanasco v. Vanasco, 503 N.Y.S.2d 480 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1986), refused to award the plaintiff a share in the defendant's Certified Public Ac-
countant's license in addition to an equitable share of the defendant's interest as partner
in his accounting firm. Pursuant to O'Brien, the court acknowledged that in the normal
case the license would constitute marital property because it was a "thing of value"
acquired during the marriage. Id. at 481. The court noted, however, that this case was
distinguishable because the license's value may "merge into the business conducted
through said license so that an evaluation of said business, rather than the license, is a
truer measure of value of said property." Id. The danger in such cases, the court ob-
served, was that plaintiff is in effect "seeking two bites of the apple." The court con-
cluded that whatever the license's value, it was "subsumed in the 'value' of the practice
so that any residual value of the license is de minimus." Id.
193. 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
194. Id. at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
195. Id. at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
196. Id. 716-17, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747-48.
197. Id. See supra notes 107, 196 and accompanying text.
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exclusive non-discretionary remedy, courts' contemporary views of
marriage and its accompanying expectations will continue to dominate
judicial perceptions of a fair result. 9 ' Further, remedial inconsisten-
cies will continue at the expense and confusion of litigants. 9'
Theories of restitution and unjust enrichment are generally inappro-
priate for application to the "contract" of marriage and its attendant
legal duty of spousal support. 2" Few disagree, however, that one
spouse's direct contributions to the other's education represents a ex-
traordinary form of support that deserves compensation. 201 The pro-
posed Model Act permits recovery limited to the amount spent for all
direct educational costs. 20 2 Thus, the award's size or duration is not
dependent on how many years the working spouse contributed to the
education or on whether the spouse earned a degree or license prior to
the divorce.203 Further, the award is not based on need or on the
198. The court in Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 492 N.E.2d 131 (1986)
recognized that Ohio's statute does not specifically provide for consideration of one
spouse's contribution to the professional education of the other as a factor in the divi-
sion of property or award of alimony. Id. at 118 n. 1, 492 N.E.2d at 133 n.1. Thus, the
court refused to find that a professional degree constituted marital property and ex-
pressed its preference to defer to a legislative resolution of this controversy. Id. at 120
n.5, 492 N.E.2d at 135 n.5. Noting that the formulation of laws "relating to divorce,
alimony, and division of property has historically been the exclusive province" of Ohio's
legislature, the court concluded that "any changes in Ohio's domestic laws regarding
the treatment of a professional degree upon divorce should emanate from the General
Assembly rather than the judiciary." Id.
199. See Mullenix, supra note 4, at 274.
200. See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 353, 661 P.2d 196, 203 (Ct. App.
1982) (restitution on the basis of unjust enrichment inappropriate in marital context).
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
201. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1979).
202. Accord Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 177, 677 P.2d 152, 159
(1984) (amount of supporting spouse's compensation limited to contributions to direct
educational costs, but did not include contributions to student spouse's living expenses
because those funds would have been expended whether or not the student spouse pur-
sued a professional ece.cation).
203. An award restricted to restitution implicitly rejects the "labor theory of value"
that a few courts and commentators continue to favor. See, e.g., Haugan v. Haugan,
117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984). In its simplest form, the theory provides
compensation to the supporting spouse in an amount equal to one-half of the student
spouse's enhanced earning capacity for the same period of time that the supporting
spouse worked to support the student. For commentary that fully develops this theory
and discusses its advantages, see Mullenix, supra note 4, at 274-83, and Note, Family
Sacrifice, supra note 4, at 288-90.
The measure of recovery under the labor theory of value, however, is not accurately
related to the relative educational costs that each spouse bore during the marriage.
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working spouse's self-supportive ability. An award based on reim-
bursement 2" is also preferable over other means of recompensing the
working spouse's contributions because it quickly severs the parties'
need for future contact.
20 5
Because the supporting spouse's financial contributions to the other's
education are not considered an ordinary form of spousal support
under the proposed statute, the statute further stipulates that the right
to compensation is unconditional. Thus, this debt cannot be dis-
charged over time by virtue of normal spousal support, no matter how
long the marriage endures after the degree is earned. The statute,
therefore, prevents any accumulation of divisible marital assets from
defeating the right to compensation.2 °6 The primary advantage this
Proponents of the degree-as-property view are likely to reject such an award because,
like restitution, it fails to give the supporting spouse her full expectancy or "return" on
her "investment" in the student spouse's education. Advocates of restitution would
likewise reject the labor theory of value, because the theory adheres to the property view
of a professional degree and "vests" the supporting spouse with a future interest in the
post-dissolution earnings of the student spouse.
204. Although this Note rejects the O'Brien court's award based on a property the-
ory, it approves of the court's observation that methods designed to compensate the
supporting spouse should not depend upon the supporting spouse's financial need for
such compensation. 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
In introducing the concept of reimbursement alimony, the court in Mahoney v. Ma-
honey, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982) also believed the supporting spouse's need
should be ignored, explaining that "there will be circumstances where a supporting
spouse should be reimbursed for the financial contributions he or she made to the
spouse's successful professional training," in spite of the appropriateness of alimony or
the existence or distributable marital property. Id. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534. See also
Mullenix, supra note 4, at 279 (supporting spouse entitled to award under labor theory
of value "without regard to duration of marriage or the accumulation of marital
assets").
205. See supra notes 107, 196-97 and accompanying text.
206. The proposed statute rejects a right to restitution subject to a rebuttable pre-
sumption similar to one the California legislature adopted. California's amended code
reads in pertinent part:
(c) The reimbursement and assignment required ... [to be made to the commu-
nity property of the parties by the degreed spouse] shall be reduced or modi-
fied to the extent circumstances render such a disposition unjust, including
but not limited to any of the following:
(1) The community has substantially benefitted from the education, train-
ing, or loan incurred for the education or training of the ... [degreed
spouse]. There is a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of
proof, that the community has not substantially benefitted from commu-
nity contributions to the education or training made less than 10 years
before the commencement of the proceeding, and that the community
has substantially benefitted from community contributions to the educa-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/7
PROFESSIONAL DEGREE MARITAL PROPERTY
feature offers over most divorce statutes is that it avoids arbitrary and
unprincipled compensatory awards which blur various forms of ali-
mony with property division. Legislating the supporting spouse's com-
pensation in this way also furnishes the parties in advance with a
definite reference for marital planning purposes or in making settle-
ment decisions.
The proposed statute also makes reimbursement the working
spouse's exclusive remedy for his or her expenditures towards the other
spouse's education or enhanced earning capacity. 20 7 Consideration of
one spouse's contributions to the other's education, training, or in-
creased earning power is eliminated as a "relevant factor" for purposes
of awarding traditional alimony or making equitable divisions of mari-
tal property. Thus, a court is prohibited from granting any form of
alimony or property distribution that is designed to protect the work-
ing spouse's expectancy interest in the professional spouse's enhanced
earning capacity.
Additionally, courts should have express authorization to order the
supported spouse to help finance an education or training that the
working spouse legitimately desires to pursue after the divorce. This
"rehabilitative alimony" award recognizes that the supporting spouse
may have foregone educational or career opportunities to allow the
professional spouse to pursue professional education.20 8 This award
provides working spouses with education or training to help reduce the
disparate income levels that so often accompany professional degree
cases.2 0 9 The supported spouse's obligation under this award is limited
to the time that the working spouse is in school, promoting a general
tion or training made more than 10 years before the commencement of
the proceeding.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(c)(1) (Deering Supp. 1987).
In contrast to California's code, the Model Statute does not require that the support-
ing spouse's contributions had "substantially enhanced" the earning capacity of the stu-
dent spouse. Conditioning the supporting spouse's right to reimbursement in such a
way forces the courts to engage in further line drawing. The working spouse either did
not did not contribute financially to the student spouse's education, and if she did, she
should be compensated. Further, this requirement does not serve a meaningful purpose
because few degree-holders exist whose educations did not substantially enhance their
earning capacity. Finally, the "substantially enhance" requirement may discriminate
against working spouses whose contributions prepared their student spouses for careers
less lucrative than medicine or law.
207. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4800.3(d). See Spousal Support, supra note 4, at 998.
208. See supra notes 88, 121 and accompanying text.
209. Spousal Support, supra note 4, at 998-99, 1003-05.
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policy of putting the parties in self-sufficient positions without the need
for further interference.21° Rehabilitative alimony applies only in a
limited number of cases.. and should not displace any traditional ali-
mony or support a court may deem appropriate. Such support should
continue to be based on traditional factors including the parties' rela-
tive needs, standards of living, and the professional spouse's ability to
pay.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Courts continue to struggle over the unique problem of how to mea-
sure the relevance and weight at divorce of one spouse's contributions
to the other's professional education or training. Ironically, both the
source of, and solution to, the problem rests in legislation. Under
vaguely worded divorce statutes, courts fashion awards of varying sizes
and duration using a myriad of rationale. The result is a distorted por-
trayal of the contemporary marital relationship and an unjust lifetime
financial burden on the professional spouse. A view slowly emerging in
the courts maintains that characterizing a degree as divisible marital
property is irrelevant. Because this leaves the fairness question unan-
swered, however, no greater consensus on the composition of an equi-
table result exists. The emerging view has actually encouraged the
evolution of a fictional "new species" of marital property to which a
professional degree arguably belongs.
The fact that marriage is not a commercial enterprise undermines
the "new property" concept. The covenants of marriage do not resem-
ble a series of enforceable rights and obligations. The relationship is
not one in which the parties keep running balances of each other's fi-
nancial and non-financial contributions to the community. Given the
parties' mutual legal duty of spousal support, recognition of the work-
ing spouse's financial contributions to the education should be limited
to direct financial contributions to the education. Although technically
inconsistent with the common-law duty of spousal support, such con-
tributions represent an extraordinary form of support that deserves
compensation. Such compensation strikes a fair balance because it rec-
ognizes that the true measure of the degree's unrealized value is wholly
attributable to the student spouse's post-divorce ability and labor and
210. See supra notes 107, 196-97 and accompanying text.
211. See Spousal Support, supra note 4, at 1004 (author points out that working
spouses may either have no desire to take advantage of such rehabilitative support or
are unable to do so because of child care responsibilities).
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not to the mere expenditure of money. In recognition of career and
educational opportunities the working spouse may have passed up, the
court should also consider the propriety of forms of support independ-
ent of the reimbursed educational costs, examining such factors as the
parties' needs, relative standards of living, and the professional spouse's
newfound ability to pay.
The discretion vested in the courts under existing state statutes
makes such statutes unadaptable to the professional degree contro-
versy. Amendments uniquely tailored to this problem are necessary to
precisely instruct the courts what relief a working spouse deserves for
contributions to the other spouse's professional education. Until legis-
latures provide clear solutions, the judiciary will continue to make arbi-
trary decisions.
Michael M. Tamburini*
* M.B.A. 1978, University of Kansas; J.D. 1987, Washington University.
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APPENDIX
MODEL MARITAL DISSOLUTION STATUTE2 12 PROVISIONS FOR
AWARDS AT DISSOLUTION
Section I-Special Definitions Applicable to Dissolutions Involving Pro-
fessional Degrees
A. "Student Spouse" shall mean a husband or wife who receives fi-
nancial contributions from the other spouse during the course of
marriage, which contributions are applied to one or more of the di-
rect costs of the recipient spouse's education or training listed in Part
D of this Section.
B. "Supporting Spouse" shall mean a husband or wife who makes
financial contributions during the course of marriage to any element
of the student spouse's direct educational costs listed in Part D of
this Section.
C. "Education" or "Training" shall mean any course of study or
training undertaken by the student spouse during the course of his or
her marriage to the supporting spouse.
D. "Direct Educational Costs" shall mean tuition, books, fees, sup-
plies, transportation, and any other necessary or incidental expenses
of the student spouse's education.
E. "Marital Property" shall mean all real and personal property pres-
ently owned by either or both spouses and acquired by either or both
spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation
agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless
of the form in which title is held. Property shall be considered Mari-
tal Property as defined by this section for the sole purpose of divid-
ing assets upon divorce and for no other purpose. Marital property
shall not include the following:
1. Separate Property as hereinafter defined;
2. Any present or future right, title, or interest of a spouse in his
education, training, or earning capacity, including any tangible or
intangible benefits directly or indirectly resulting from the spouse's
education, training, or earning capacity, without regard to when
such education, training, or earning capacity was acquired.
F. "Separate Property" shall mean:
212. Selected provisions in this model statute not specifically addressed to the
contributions of one spouse to the other's education or career were excerpted from both
the New York and Wisconsin statutes.
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1. All real and personal property acquired by a spouse after a
decree of legal separation;
2. All real and personal property acquired at any time by be-
quest, devise, descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse;
3. All real and personal property acquired in exchange for prop-
erty acquired prior to the marriage or in exchange for property ac-
quired by bequest, devise, descent, or gift from a party other than the
spouse;
4. The appreciation of or income from property acquired before
the marriage, except to the extent that the other spouse substantially
contributed to the preservation and appreciation of such property;
5. Compensation for personal injuries; and
6. All property described as separate property by valid written
agreement of the parties.
Section II-Spousal Education Support, Rehabilitative Support, and
General Support Awards
A. Spousal Contributions Towards Attainment of a Professional
Degree
1. Spousal Education Support Award: upon every judgment of
annulment, divorce, or legal separation in which the court deter-
mines that the supporting spouse has made financial contributions to
the direct educational costs of the student spouse's education or
training, the court shall award the supporting spouse an amount
equal to such contributions.
2. The student spouse's entitlement to the spousal education
support award provided for in this section shall be independent of
and may be in addition to any distributive or other support award
provided for in this Divorce Code which the court may deem proper
under the circumstances.
3. Supporting Spouse's Burden of Proof: the court's determina-
tion with respect to such contributions shall be established if the fact
of such contributions is proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.
B. Rehabilitative Support
In addition to and independent of any distributive or support award
the court may deem proper under other provisions of this Divorce
Code, the court, in its discretion, may award, upon every judgment
of annulment, dissolution, or legal separation, rehabilitative support
to the supporting spouse for the purpose of subsidizing the direct
educational costs of any post-dissolution education or training un-
dertaken by the supporting spouse. Such an award shall be no
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greater than one-half of all direct educational costs incurred by the
supporting spouse.
C. General Support
Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce, or legal separation, or
in a proceeding for general support following dissolution of the mar-
riage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent
spouse, the court may grant an order requiring general support pay-
ments to either spouse after considering:
1. The length of the marriage;
2. The ages, and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions
of each party;
3. The relative earnings, earning capacities, assets, and other fi-
nancial resources of the parties, including but not limited to medical,
retirement, insurance, or other benefits, and the marital property ap-
portioned to each party;
4. The relative obligations and liabilities of the parties;
5. The standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage;
6. The extent to which either party has custodial responsibilities
for children and the extent to which a provision for support of a
child living with the party includes a sum for that party as
custodian;
7. Any award of rehabilitative support under Part B of this
section;
8. The relative abilities of each party to meet his reasonable
needs independently, including the relative education or training of
the parties, and the time necessary for the party seeking support to
acquire sufficient education or training to find appropriate employ-
ment and become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably
comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage;
9. The contributions and services to the marriage of the party
seeking support as a spouse, parent, wage earner, and homemaker;
10. The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party to
seek employment outside the home because that party will be custo-
dian of a minor child;
11. The value of the separate property set apart to each party;
12. The tax consequences to each party;
13. The destruction, concealment, fraudulent disposition, or
wasteful dissipation of family assets by either spouse;
14. The marital misconduct of the parties during the marriage in
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cases where the court, in its discretion, deems it appropriate to do so;
however, the marital misconduct of either of the parties during sepa-
ration subsequent to the filing of a divorce complaint shall not be
considered by the court in its determinations relative to general sup-
port; and
15. Such other factors as the court may in each individual case
determine to be relevant, except for one party's contributions,
whether monetary or non-monetary, to the other's education or
training.
Section III-Disposition of Property
Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce, or legal separation,
or in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of
the marriage, the court shall set apart to each spouse his separate
property and shall divide the marital property in such proportions as
the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, after
considering all relevant factors, including:
1. The length of the marriage;
2. The ages, and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions
of each party;
3. The current and probable future financial circumstances of
each party, including current and anticipated earning capacities
based on education, training, work experience, employment skills,
length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities
for children;
4. The value of the separate property set apart to each party;
5. The need of a party having custody of any children to own or
occupy the family home and to own or use its household effects;
6. Any award of general support under Part C of this section;
7. The contributions, monetary and non-monetary, of each party
to the well being of the children and to the acquisition of marital
property, giving appropriate economic value to each party's contri-
bution in homemaking and child care services;
8. The liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
9. Any valid written agreement made by the parties before or
during the marriage concerning property distribution;
10. The tax consequences to each party; and
11. Such other factors as the court may in each individual case
determine to be relevant, except for one party's contributions,
whether monetary or non-monetary, to the other's education or
training.
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